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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
CHARACTERIZING INTERNET WORM SPATIAL-TEMPORAL INFECTION
STRUCTURES
by
Qian Wang
Florida International University, 2010
Miami, Florida
Professor Niki Pissinou, Major Professor
Since the Morris worm was released in 1988, Internet worms continue to be one of top
security threats. For example, the Conficker worm infected 9 to 15 million machines in
early 2009 and shut down the service of some critical government and medical networks.
Moreover, it constructed a massive peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet. Botnets are zombie net-
works controlled by attackers setting out coordinated attacks. In recent years, botnets have
become the number one threat to the Internet.
The objective of this research is to characterize spatial-temporal infection structures of
Internet worms, and apply the observations to study P2P-based botnets formed by worm
infection.
First, we infer temporal characteristics of the Internet worm infection structure, i.e.,
the host infection time and the worm infection sequence, and thus pinpoint patient zero or
initially infected hosts. Specifically, we apply statistical estimation techniques on Darknet
observations. We show analytically and empirically that our proposed estimators can sig-
nificantly improve the inference accuracy. Second, we reveal two key spatial characteristics
of the Internet worm infection structure, i.e., the number of children and the generation of
the underlying tree topology formed by worm infection. Specifically, we apply probabilistic
modeling methods and a sequential growth model. We show analytically and empirically
that the number of children has asymptotically a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5,
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and the generation follows closely a Poisson distribution. Finally, we evaluate bot detec-
tion strategies and effects of user defenses in P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection.
Specifically, we apply the observations of the number of children and demonstrate ana-
lytically and empirically that targeted detection that focuses on the nodes with the largest
number of children is an efficient way to expose bots. However, we also point out that fu-
ture botnets may self-stop scanning to weaken targeted detection, without greatly slowing
down the speed of worm infection. We then extend the worm spatial infection structure and
show empirically that user defenses, e.g., patching or cleaning, can significantly mitigate
the robustness and the effectiveness of P2P-based botnets. To counterattack, we evalu-
ate a simple measure by future botnets that enhances topology robustness through worm
re-infection.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Internet worms are malicious software that can compromise vulnerable hosts and use them
to attack other victims, and have been one of top security threats since the Morris worm
in 1988. Botnets are zombie networks controlled by attackers through Internet relay chat
(IRC) systems (e.g., GT Bot) or peer-to-peer (P2P) systems (e.g., Storm) to execute co-
ordinated attacks and have become the number one threat to the Internet in recent years.
The main difference between worms and botnets lies in that worms emphasize the proce-
dures of infecting targets and propagating among vulnerable hosts, whereas botnets focus
on the mechanisms of organizing the network of compromised computers and setting out
coordinated attacks, such as sending denial-of-service attacks, producing spams, and steal-
ing financial information. Most botnets, however, still apply worm-scanning methods to
recruit new bots or collect network information [1, 2, 3, 4]. Moreover, although many P2P-
based botnets use the existing P2P networks to build a bootstrap procedure, Conficker C
forms a P2P botnet through scan-based peer discovery [5, 6]. Specifically, Conficker C
searches for new peers by randomly scanning the entire Internet address space. As a result,
the way that Conficker C constructs a P2P-based botnet is in principle the same as worm
scanning/infection. Therefore, characterizing structures of worm infection is important and
imperative for defending against current and future epidemics such as Internet worms and
Conficker C like P2P-based botnets.
1.1 Internet Worm Spatial-Temporal Infection Structures
Since the Code Red worm in 2001, Internet worms have been an active research topic.
Many research works have been developed to characterize the spread of worms, estimate
worm behaviors, and contain worm propagation. Most previous works, however, have
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focused on the macro-level characteristics of worm infection. For example, different ana-
lytical approaches have been applied to study the total number of infected hosts over time
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 1, 12]. The micro-level information of worm infection that focuses on
individual hosts, however, has been investigated little. In this thesis, we focus on individ-
ual infected hosts and study their infection relationships, i.e., the Internet worm infection
structure.
When a host infects another host, they form a “father-and-son” relationship, which is
represented by a directed edge in a graph formed by worm infection, the worm infection
family tree, called the “worm tree” in short (see Fig. 1.1). That is, the procedure of worm
propagation constructs a directed tree where patient zero is the root and the infected hosts
that do not compromise any vulnerable host are leaves. Based on the perspective from
which the worm tree is investigated, we divide the Internet worm infection structure into
two domains: the temporal and spatial infection structures. The worm temporal infection
structure describes the temporal infection relationship between individual infected hosts in
the worm tree by studying their infection times, and therefore sheds light on the information
of “who infects before whom”; the worm spatial infection structure characterizes the spatial
infection relationship between individual infected hosts by studying the topology of the
worm tree, and therefore provides insights into the information of “who infects whom”.
1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions
The objective of this thesis is to characterize the spatial-temporal infection structures of
Internet worms, and apply the observations to study P2P-based botnets formed by worm
infection. Specifically, we investigate the following three topics:
1. Characterizing Internet worm temporal infection structure: First, we infer the
temporal infection relationship between individual infected hosts by answering the follow-
ing two questions:
2
Patient zero
Figure 1.1: A worm tree.
• Host infection time: When exactly does a specific host get infected? This information
is critical for the reconstruction of the worm infection sequence.
• Worm infection sequence: What is the order in which hosts are infected by worm
propagation? Such an order can help identify patient zero or initially infected hosts.
The information of both the infection time and the infection sequence is important for
defending against worms. First, the identification of patient zero or initially infected hosts
and their infection times provide forensic clues for law enforcement against the attackers
who wrote and spread the worm. Second, the knowledge of the infection sequence provides
insights into how a worm spread across the Internet and how network defense systems were
breached.
To answer these two questions analytically, we apply Internet worm tomography, which
refers to inferring the characteristics of Internet worms from the observations of Darknet
that monitor a routable but unused IP address space. Specifically, we introduce statistical
estimation techniques and propose method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear
regression estimators. We then apply Monte Carlo simulation to verify our analytical re-
sults. Our research work makes several contributions:
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• We propose method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear regression statisti-
cal estimators to infer the host infection time. We show analytically and empirically
that the mean squared error of our proposed estimators can be almost half of that
of the naive estimator used in the previous work [13] in inferring the host infection
time.
• We extend our proposed estimators to infer the worm infection sequence. Specif-
ically, we formulate the problem of estimating the worm infection sequence as a
detection problem and derive the probability of error detection for different estima-
tors. We demonstrate analytically and empirically that our method performs much
better than the algorithm proposed in the previous work [13].
• We show empirically that our estimators have a better performance in identifying
patient zero or initially infected hosts of the smart worm than the naive estimator.
We also demonstrate that our estimators can be applied to worms using different
scanning strategies such as random scanning and localized scanning.
2. Characterizing Internet worm spatial infection structure: Next, we investigate
the spatial infection relationship between individual infected hosts by studying the follow-
ing two metrics of the worm tree:
• Number of children: For a randomly selected node in the tree, how many children
does it have? This metric represents the infection ability of individual hosts.
• Generation: For a randomly selected node in the tree, which generation (or level)
does it belong to? This metric indicates the average path length of the graph formed
by worm infection.
These two metrics have important implications and applications for security analysis. For
example, the distribution of the number of children can be used to answer questions such
as what is the probability that an infected host compromises more than 10 vulnerable hosts.
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Moreover, some schemes have been proposed to trace worms back to their origins through
the cooperation between infected hosts [14], and the distribution of generations can provide
the information on the number of hosts required to cooperate.
To study these two metrics analytically, we apply probabilistic modeling methods and
a sequential growth model. Specifically, we start from a worm tree with only patient zero
and add new nodes into the worm tree sequentially. We then investigate the relationship
between the two worm trees before and after a new node is added and verify our analysis
through simulation. Our research work makes several contributions:
• We show both analytically and empirically that if a worm uses a scanning method
for which a new victim is compromised by each existing infected host with equal
probability, the number of children has asymptotically a geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5. This means that on average half of infected hosts never compromise
any target and over 98% of infected hosts have no more than five children. On the
other hand, this also indicates that a small portion of hosts infect a large number of
vulnerable hosts.
• We demonstrate analytically and empirically that the generation closely follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter Hn − 1, where n is the number of nodes and Hn
is the n-th harmonic number [15]. This means that the average path length of the
worm tree increases approximately logarithmically with the number of nodes.
• We show empirically that if a worm uses localized scanning, the number of children
still has approximately a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. Moreover, the
generation still follows a Poisson distribution, but with the parameter depending on
the probability of local scanning. Therefore, most previous observations also apply
to localized-scanning worms.
3. Evaluating P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection: Finally, we study P2P-
based botnets formed by worm infection and answer the following two questions:
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• Bot detection: What is the most effective method to detect bots? This information is
critical for defenders to combat against botnets.
• User defenses: How do user defenses (e.g., host patching or cleaning) affect P2P-
based botnets formed by worm infection? This information helps defenders evaluate
the effectiveness of their defense systems.
The answer of the first question is directly related to the number of children of the
worm spatial infection structure. For example, if a very small number of hosts infect a
large number of machines and the majority of hosts have none or few children, such botnets
are robust to random defenses, but are vulnerable to targeted defenses of a small portion
of nodes with highest node degrees [16]. On the other hand, if each host has a similar
node degree, then such botnets are robust to both defense schemes [16]. The answer of the
second question reflects the robustness and the effectiveness of the botnet topology formed
by worm infection under user defenses. For example, if user defenses disrupt the botnet
into a collection of small isolated botnets, then the effectiveness is lower than the single
connected botnet with the same total number of bots.
To answer these two questions, we first evaluate efficient bot detection methods both
analytically and empirically by applying the results of the number of children of the worm
spatial infection structure. We then empirically study effects of user defenses on the botnet
topology formed by worm infection. Specifically, we study the number of peers (i.e., the
number of father and children for a randomly selected bot in the botnet topology), and the
botnet size (i.e., the number of bots for a randomly selected botnet in the topology). Our
research work makes several contributions:
• We show both analytically and empirically that while randomly examining a small
portion of nodes in a botnet (i.e., random detection) can only expose a limited number
of bots, examining the nodes with the largest number of children (i.e., targeted de-
tection) is much more efficient in detecting bots. For example, our simulation shows
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that when 3.125% nodes are examined, random detection exposes totally 9.10% bots,
whereas targeted detection reveals 22.36% bots.
• We find empirically that when user countermeasures are considered, the distribution
of the number of peers has an exponential scaling with the decay constant increasing
with the number of patched or cleaned hosts. This implies that a small percentage of
bots have a large number of peers and the majority of bots have none or few peers.
Moreover, the distribution of the disconnected botnet size has a power-law tail with
the scaling exponent increasing with the number of patched or cleaned hosts. This
reflects that patching or cleaning severely disrupts the single worm tree. We also find
that the size of the largest isolated botnet is relatively small. Therefore, P2P-based
botnets formed by worm infection are vulnerable to targeted defenses and ineffective
due to patching or cleaning. However, we discover that botmasters may potentially
enhance the robustness and the effectiveness of P2P-based botnets through worm
re-infection.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 surveys the related work. Chapter
3 infers temporal characteristics of the Internet worm infection structure, i.e., the host in-
fection time and the worm infection sequence. Chapter 4 characterizes the Internet worm
spatial infection structure and reveals two key characteristics, i.e., the number of children
and the generation of the underlying tree topology formed by worm infection. Next, Chap-
ter 5 evaluates bot detection strategies and effects of user defenses in P2P-based botnets
formed by worm infection. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and identifies future
research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In the first chapter, we identified our research objectives and outlined our contributions. In
this chapter, we answer the following questions: Why are existing techniques or models
not sufficient for characterizing the worm infection structure? And how are they related to
or different from our solution?
2.1 Internet Worm Temporal Infection Structure
Under the framework of Internet worm tomography, several works have applied Darknet
observations to infer the characteristics of worms. For example, Chen et al. studied how
the Darknet can be used to monitor, detect, and defend against Internet worms [9]. Moore
et al. applied network telescope observations and least squares fitting methods to infer
the number of infected hosts and scanning rates of infected hosts [17]. Some works have
researched on how to use Darknet observations to detect the appearance of worms [18, 12,
19, 20]. For instance, Zou et al. used a Kalman filter to infer the infection rate of a worm
and then detect the worm [12]. Moreover, the Darknet observations have been used to study
the feature of a specific worm, such as Code Red [21], Slammer [22], and Witty [23].
Internet worm tomography has been applied to infer worm temporal characteristics.
For example, Kumar et al. used network telescope data and analyzed the pseudo-random
number generator to reconstruct the “who infected whom” infection tree of the Witty worm
[24]. Hamadeh et al. further described a general framework to recover the infection se-
quence for both TCP and UDP scanning worms from network telescope data [25]. Rajab
et al. applied the same data and studied the “infection and detection times” to infer the
worm infection sequence [13]. Different from the above works, in Chapter 3, we employ
advanced statistical estimation techniques to Internet worm tomography.
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2.2 Internet Worm Spatial Infection Structure
Some efforts have been focused on individual infected hosts and studied the worm infection
sequence [24, 13, 14, 26]. The prior work investigates the details of the random number
generator of worm propagation [24] or infers the worm infection sequence through the ob-
servations of network telescopes [13, 26]. In Chapter 4, we apply probabilistic modeling
methods and reveal key micro-level information of the worm spatial infection structure,
such as the infection ability of individual hosts and the underlying tree topology formed
by worm infection. Moreover, Sellke et al. applied a branching process to study the effec-
tiveness of a containment strategy [27]. They assume that the total number of scans of an
infected host is bounded. As a result, the worm tree studied in their work is fundamentally
different from the one in our work.
Modeling the topology generation process has been an active research area. For ex-
ample, Baraba´si et al. developed the well-known Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model and used a
mean-field approach to characterize the growth of a topology with both preferential attach-
ment and uniform attachment [28, 29]. Moreover, two exact mathematical models have
been studied for the BA model [30, 31]. From the theoretical aspect, our proposed worm
tree is similar to the random tree. For example, Devroye used the records theory to derive
the distribution of the level of a random ordered tree in [32]. Compared with these theoreti-
cal efforts, our work studies a very different problem (i.e., worm spatial infection structure)
and uses a very different approach (i.e., probabilistic modeling).
2.3 P2P-based Botnets Formed by Worm Infection
Botnets have become the top threat to the Internet in recent years [33, 34], and are rapidly
transiting from IRC systems to P2P systems [35]. In [36], Wang et al. gave a systematic
study on P2P-based botnets. Moreover, it has been shown that in current botnets, worm
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infection is still a main tool for recruiting new bots or collecting network information,
and random scanning has been widely used [2]. Several methods have been proposed to
construct P2P-based botnets through worm infection and re-infection [3, 4]. Different from
the above works, in our P2P-based botnets studied in Chapter 5, there is no grouping of
bots or exchange of peers between bots. Infected hosts are only peers to their own infectors
and infectees.
In [16], Dagon et al. surveyed different P2P-based botnet topologies, such as random
graphs and power-law topologies. It has been shown that power-law topologies are robust
to random node removal, but are vulnerable to the removal of a small portion of nodes with
highest node degrees; random graphs are robust to both removal schemes [16, 37]. Our
work takes one step further to quantitatively evaluate bot detection strategies and effects of
user defenses by exploiting the P2P-based botnet topology formed by worm infection.
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CHAPTER 3
CHARACTERIZING INTERNET WORM TEMPORAL INFECTION
STRUCTURE
Since Code Red and Nimda worms were released in 2001, epidemic-style attacks have
caused severe damages. Internet worms can spread so rapidly that existing defense systems
cannot respond until most vulnerable hosts have been infected. For example, on January
25th, 2003, the Slammer worm reached its maximum scanning rate of more than 55 mil-
lion scans per second in about 3 minutes, and infected more than 90% of vulnerable ma-
chines within 10 minutes [22]. It cost over one billion US dollars in cleanup and economic
damages. Therefore, worm attacks pose significant threats to the Internet and meanwhile
present tremendous challenges to the research community.
To counteract these notorious plague-tide attacks, various detection and defense strate-
gies have been studied in recent years. According to where the detectors are located, these
strategies can generally be classified into three categories: source detection and defenses,
detecting infected hosts in the local networks [38, 39, 40, 41]; middle detection and de-
fenses, revealing the appearance of worms by analyzing the traffic going through routers
[14, 42, 43]; and destination detection and defenses, monitoring unwanted traffic arriving
at Darknet or network telescopes, a globally routable address space where no active ser-
vices or servers reside [44, 45, 46, 47, 48]. There are two types of Darknet: active Darknet
that responds to malicious scans to elicit the payloads of the attacks [46, 47], and passive
Darknet that observes unwanted traffic passively [45, 48].
Different from source and middle detection and defenses, destination detection and
defenses offer unique advantages in observing large-scale network explosive events such
as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [49] and Internet worms [21, 22, 23]. There
is no legitimate reason for packets destined to Darknet. Hence, most of the traffic arriving at
Darknet is malicious or unintended, including hostile reconnaissance scans, probe activities
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Figure 3.1: Internet worm tomography.
from active worms, DDoS backscatter, and packets from mis-configured hosts. Moreover,
it has been shown that for a large-scale worm event, most of infected hosts, if not all, can
be observed by the Darknet with a sufficiently large size [9].
In this chapter, we focus on the destination detection and defenses. Specifically, we
study the problem of inferring the characteristics of Internet worms from Darknet observa-
tions. We refer to such a problem as Internet worm tomography, as illustrated in Fig.3.1.
Most worms use scan-based methods to find vulnerable hosts and randomly generate target
IP addresses. Thus, Darknet can observe partial scans from infected hosts. Together with
the worm propagation model and the statistical model, Darknet observations can be used
to detect worm appearance [18, 50, 19, 20] and infer worm characteristics (e.g., infection
rate [12], number of infected hosts [9, 17], and worm infection sequence [24, 13, 26]).
Internet worm tomography is named after network tomography, which infers the charac-
teristics of the internal network (e.g., link loss rate, link delay, and topology) through the
observations from end systems [51, 52]. Network tomography can be formulated as a linear
inverse problem. Internet worm tomography, however, cannot be translated into the linear
inverse problem due to the specific properties of worm propagation, and thus presents new
challenges.
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Under the framework of Internet worm tomography, researchers have studied worm
temporal characteristics of the worm infection structure (i.e., the host infection time and
the worm infection sequence) [13, 24]. For example, a simple estimator has been proposed
in [13] to infer worm temporal behaviors. The estimator uses the observation time when an
infected host scans the Darknet for the first time as the approximation of the host infection
time to infer the worm infection sequence. Such a naive estimator, however, does not fully
exploit all information obtained by the Darknet. Moreover, an attacker can design a smart
worm that uses lower scanning rates for patient zero or initially infected hosts and higher
scanning rates for other infected hosts. In this way, the smart worm would weaken the
performance of the naive estimator.
The goal of this chapter is to infer the Internet worm temporal characteristics accurately
by exploiting Darknet observations and applying statistical estimation techniques. Specifi-
cally, we introduce statistical estimation techniques and propose method of moments, max-
imum likelihood, and linear regression estimators. We then apply Monte Carlo simulation
to verify our analytical results.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces estimators
for inferring the host infection time. Section 3.2 presents our algorithms in estimating
the worm infection sequence. Section 3.3 gives simulation results. Finally, Section 3.4
discusses the assumptions, the limitations, and the extensions of our estimators.
3.1 Estimating the Host Infection Time
We use Darknet observations to estimate when a host gets infected and use hit to denote
the event that a worm scan hits the Darknet. As shown in Fig. 3.2, suppose that a certain
host is infected at time t0. The Darknet monitors a portion of the IPv4 address space and
can observe some scans from this host and record hit times t1, t2, · · · , tn, where n is the
number of hit events from this host. The problem of estimating the host infection time can
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then be stated as follows: Given the Darknet observations t1, t2, · · · , tn, what is the best
estimate of t0?
To study this problem analytically, we make the following assumptions: 1) There is
no packet loss in the Internet. In Section 3.4, however, we relax this assumption and use
simulations to study the effect of packet losses on different estimators. 2) An infected host
uses its actual source IP address and does not apply IP spoofing, which is the case for TCP
worms. 3) The scanning rate s (i.e., the number of scans sent by an infected host per time
unit) is time-invariant for an infected host, whereas the scanning rates of infected hosts can
be different from each other. The last assumption comes from the observation that famous
worms, such as Code Red, Nimda, Slammer, and Witty, do not apply any scanning rate
variation mechanisms. An infected host always scans for vulnerable hosts at the maximum
speed allowed by its computing resources and network conditions [53].
Obviously, inferring t0 from Darknet observations is affected by the Internet-worm
scanning methods. In this work, we focus on random scanning and localized scanning.
However, our estimation techniques can be applied to other worm-scanning methods, such
as importance scanning [54], for which a scan from an infected host hits Darknet with a
time-invariant probability. To analytically estimate the host infection time, we consider
a discrete-time system. For random scanning (RS), a worm selects targets randomly and
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scans the entire IPv4 address space with Ω addresses (i.e., Ω = 232). We assume that Dark-
net monitors ω addresses. Thus, the probability for a scan to hit the Darknet is ω/Ω; and
the probability of a hit event in the discrete-time system (i.e., the probability that Darknet
observes at least one scan from the same infected host in a time unit) is
PrRS(hit event) = 1−
(
1−
ω
Ω
)s
. (3.1)
Since s is time-invariant for a given infected host, PrRS(hit event) is also time-invariant.
Localized scanning (LS) preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the “local” ad-
dress space [55]. For simplicity, in this work we only consider the /l LS: pa(0 ≤ pa < 1)
of the time, a “local” IP address with the same first l bits as the attacking host is chosen
as the target; 1 − pa of the time, a random address is chosen. We consider a centralized
Darknet that occupies a continuous address space and monitors ω addresses. Moreover, we
assume that the Darknet is contained in a /l prefix with no vulnerable hosts. For example,
network telescopes used by CAIDA are such a centralized Darknet and contain a /8 subnet.
Since no infected hosts exist in the /l subnet where the Darknet resides, the probability for
a worm scan to hit the Darknet is (1− pa) · ω/Ω. Therefore, the probability of a hit event
in the discrete-time system is
PrLS(hit event) = 1−
(
1− (1− pa) ·
ω
Ω
)s
, (3.2)
which is time-invariant. Since PrRS(hit event) has a similar form as PrLS(hit event) and is
the special case of PrLS(hit event) when pa = 0, we use p (0 < p < 1) to denote the hit
probability in general for both cases to simplify our discussion.
Denote δ0 as the time interval between when a host gets infected and when Darknet
observes the first scan from this host, i.e., δ0 = t1 − t0, as shown in Fig. 3.2. Denote
δi as the time interval between i-th hit and (i + 1)-th hit on Darknet, i.e., δi = ti+1 − ti,
i ≥ 1. Thus, δ0, δ1, · · · , δn−1 are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and follow
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a geometric distribution with parameter p, i.e.,
Pr(δ = k) = p · (1− p)k−1, k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , (3.3)
E(δ) =
1
p
= µ, Var(δ) = 1− p
p2
. (3.4)
Denote µ as the mean value of δ and µˆ as the estimate of µ. We then estimate t0 by
subtracting µˆ from t1, i.e.,
tˆ0 = t1 − µˆ. (3.5)
Therefore, our problem is reduced to estimating µ.
3.1.1 Naive Estimator
Since δ follows the geometric distribution as described by Equation (5.6), Pr(δ) is maxi-
mized when δ = 1. Then, a naive estimator (NE) of µ is
µˆNE = 1. (3.6)
Thus, the NE of t0 is
tˆ0NE = t1 − µˆNE = t1 − 1. (3.7)
Note that tˆ0NE depends only on t1, but not on t2, t3, · · · , tn. This estimator has been used
in [13] to infer the host infection time and the worm infection sequence. In this work,
however, we consider more advanced estimation methods.
3.1.2 Method of Moments Estimator
Since E(δ) = µ, we design a method of moments estimator (MME), i.e.,
µˆMME = δ =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
δi =
tn − t1
n− 1
. (3.8)
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Thus, the MME of t0 is
tˆ0MME = t1 − µˆMME = t1 −
tn − t1
n− 1
. (3.9)
Note that tˆ0MME is not only related to t1, but also to n and tn.
3.1.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Rewrite the probability mass function of δ in Equation (5.6) with respect to µ,
Pr(δ;µ) = 1
µ
(
1− 1
µ
)δ−1
, δ = 1, 2, 3, · · · . (3.10)
Since δ1, δ2, · · · , δn−1 are i.i.d., the likelihood function is given by the following product
L(µ) =
n−1∏
i=1
Pr(δi;µ)
=
(1
µ
)n−1(
1−
1
µ
)(n−1∑
i=1
δi)−(n−1)
. (3.11)
We then design a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), i.e.,
µˆMLE = argmax
µ
L(µ). (3.12)
Rather than maximizing L(µ), we choose to maximize its logarithm lnL(µ). That is,
d
dµ
lnL(µ) = 0 (3.13)
=⇒ µˆMLE =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
δi =
tn − t1
n− 1
, (3.14)
which has the same expression as the MME. Thus,
tˆ0MLE = t1 − µˆMLE = t1 −
tn − t1
n− 1
. (3.15)
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3.1.4 Linear Regression Estimator
Under the assumption that the scanning rate of an individual infected host is time-invariant,
the relationship between ti and i can be described by a linear regression model as illustrated
in Fig. 3.3, i.e.,
ti = α + β · i+ εi, (3.16)
where α and β are coefficients, and εi is the error term. To fit the observation data, we
apply the least squares method to adjust the parameters of the model. That is, we choose
the coefficients that minimize the residual sum of squares (RSS)
RSS =
n∑
i=1
[ti − (α+ β · i)]
2. (3.17)
The minimum RSS occurs when the partial derivatives with respect to the coefficients are
zero 

∂RSS
∂α
= −2
n∑
i=1
(ti − α− β · i) = 0
∂RSS
∂β
= −2
n∑
i=1
i · (ti − α− β · i) = 0,
(3.18)
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which leads to 

αˆ = t− βˆ · i
βˆ =
i · t− i · t
i2 − (i)2
,
(3.19)
where the bar symbols denote the average values

i =
1
n
n∑
i=1
i, i2 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
i2
t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ti, i · t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
i · ti.
(3.20)
We then design a linear regression estimator (LRE), i.e.,
µˆLRE = βˆ = tˆ1 − tˆ0. (3.21)
Thus, the LRE of t0 is
tˆ0LRE = t1 − µˆLRE = t1 −
i · t− i · t
i2 − (i)2
. (3.22)
There is another way to estimate t0, which uses the point of interception shown in Fig.
3.3 as the estimation of t0, i.e.,
tˆ0
′
LRE = αˆ = t− µˆLRE · i. (3.23)
However, we find that the mean squared error of tˆ0
′
LRE increases when n increases. That is,
the performance of the estimator worsens with the increasing number of hits, which makes
this estimator undesirable.
3.1.5 Comparison of Estimators
To compare the performance of the naive estimator and our proposed estimators, we com-
pute the bias, the variance, and the mean squared error (MSE). For estimating µ,

Bias(µˆ) = E(µˆ)− µ
Var(µˆ) = E [(µˆ− E(µˆ))2]
MSE(µˆ) = E [(µˆ− µ)2] = Bias2(µˆ) + Var(µˆ).
(3.24)
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Table 3.1: Comparison of estimator properties (µˆ).
µˆ Bias(µˆ) Var(µˆ) MSE(µˆ)
µˆNE = 1 1−
1
p
0 (1−p)
2
p2
µˆMME = µˆMLE =
tn−t1
n−1
0 1−p
p2(n−1)
1−p
p2(n−1)
µˆLRE =
i·t−i·t
i2−(i)2
0 6(n
2+1)(1−p)
5n(n2−1)p2
6(n2+1)(1−p)
5n(n2−1)p2
Table 3.2: Comparison of estimator properties (tˆ0).
tˆ0 = t1 − µˆ Bias(tˆ0) Var(tˆ0) MSE(tˆ0)
tˆ0NE
1−p
p
1−p
p2
(1−p)(2−p)
p2
(≈ 2(1−p)
p2
, when p≪ 1)
tˆ0MME = tˆ0MLE 0
1−p
p2
· n
n−1
1−p
p2
· n
n−1
(≈ 1−p
p2
, when n≫ 1)
tˆ0LRE 0
1−p
p2
· 5n
3+6n2−5n+6
5n(n2−1)
1−p
p2
· 5n
3+6n2−5n+6
5n(n2−1)
(≈ 1−p
p2
, when n≫ 1)
Here, the bias denotes the average deviation of the estimator from the true value; the vari-
ance indicates the distance between the estimator and its mean; and the MSE characterizes
the closeness of the estimated value to the true value. A smaller MSE indicates a better
estimator. Table 3.1 summarizes the results of NE, MME (or MLE), and LRE for estimat-
ing µ. The details of the derivations of Table 3.1 are given in Appendix A. It is noted that
MME and LRE are unbiased, while NE is biased. Moreover, MME and LRE have a smaller
MSE than NE if n > 2 and p < 0.5, a condition that is usually satisfied. Specifically, when
n → ∞, MSE(µˆMME) → 0 and MSE(µˆLRE) → 0, but MSE(µˆNE) → (1 − p)2/p2. It is also
observed that MME is slightly better than LRE in terms of MSE when n > 2.
Similarly, we compute the bias, the variance, and the MSE of the estimators for estimat-
ing t0 in Table 3.2. The details of the derivations of Table 3.2 are given in Appendix B. We
also observe that MME (or MLE) and LRE are unbiased, whereas NE is biased. Moreover,
MSE(tˆ0MME) and MSE(tˆ0LRE) are smaller than MSE(tˆ0NE), and MSE(tˆ0MME) is the smallest
when n > 3 and p < 0.5. Specifically, in practice, Darknet only covers a relatively small
portion of the IPv4 address space (i.e., ω ≪ Ω), which leads to p ≪ 1. Thus, we have the
following theorem:
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Theorem 3.1.1 When the Darknet observes a sufficient number of hits (i.e., n ≫ 1) and
p≪ 1,
MSE(tˆ0MME) ≈ MSE(tˆ0LRE) ≈
1
2
MSE(tˆ0NE). (3.25)
That is, the MSE of our proposed estimators is almost half of that of the naive estimator.
That is, our proposed estimators are nearly twice as accurate as the naive estimator in
estimating the host infection time.
3.2 Estimating the Worm Infection Sequence
In this section, we extend our proposed estimators for inferring the worm infection se-
quence.
3.2.1 Algorithm
Our algorithm is that we first estimate the infection time of each infected host. Then, we
reconstruct the infection sequence based on these infection times. That is, if tˆ0A < tˆ0B, we
infer that host A is infected before host B. It is noted that the algorithm used in [13] to
infer the worm infection sequence can be regarded as using this approach with the naive
estimator.
The naive estimator, however, can potentially fail to infer the worm infection sequence
in some cases. Fig. 3.4 shows an example, where hosts A and B get infected at t0A and t0B,
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respectively, and t0A < t0B. Moreover, these two infected hosts have scanning rates sA < sB
such that Darknet observes t1A > t1B. If the naive estimator is used, tˆ0A > tˆ0B, which means
that host A is incorrectly inferred to be infected after host B. Intuitively, if our proposed
estimators are applied, it is possible to obtain tˆ0A < tˆ0B and thus recover the real infection
sequence.
3.2.2 Performance Analysis
To analytically show that our estimators are more accurate than the naive estimator in es-
timating the worm infection sequence, we formulate the problem as a detection problem.
Specifically, in Fig. 3.4, suppose that host B is infected after host A (i.e., t0A < t0B). If
tˆ0A < tˆ0B, we call it “success” detection; otherwise, if tˆ0A > tˆ0B, we call it “error” detec-
tion1. We intend to calculate the probability of error detection for different estimators.
Note that δ0A = t1A − t0A and δ0B = t1B − t0B follow the geometric distribution (i.e.,
Equation (5.6)) with parameter pA and pB, respectively. Here, pA (or pB) is the probability
that at least one scan from host A (or B) hits the Darknet in a time unit and follows Equation
(3.1) for random scanning and Equation (3.2) for localized scanning. Moreover, pA (or pB)
depends on sA (or sB) so that if sA < sB, then pA < pB. Since ω ≪ Ω, we have pA ≪ 1
and pB ≪ 1. Hence, for simplicity we use the continuous-time analysis and apply the
exponential distribution to approximate the geometric distribution for δ0A and δ0B [56], i.e.,
f(x;λ) =


λe−λx, x ≥ 0
0, x < 0,
(3.26)
where λ = pA or pB.
To calculate the probability of error detection for different estimators, we first define a
new random variable
Z = δ0A − δ0B, (3.27)
1We ignore the case tˆ0A = tˆ0B here.
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and calculate its probability density function (pdf) fZ(z). From Equation (3.26), we can
obtain the pdf of δ′0B = −δ0B, which is
fδ′0B(x) =


pB e
pBx, x ≤ 0
0, x > 0.
(3.28)
Since δ0A and δ′0B are independent, the pdf of Z = δ0A + δ′0B is given by the convolution of
fδ0A(x) and fδ′0B(x), i.e.,
fZ(z) =
∫ +∞
−∞
fδ0A(x)fδ′0B(z − x) dx. (3.29)
For z ≥ 0, this yields
fZ(z) =
∫ +∞
z
pA e
−pAx · pB e
pB(z−x) dx
= pApB
pA+pB
e−pAz. (3.30)
For z < 0, we obtain
fZ(z) =
∫ +∞
0
pA e
−pAx · pB e
pB(z−x) dx
= pApB
pA+pB
epBz. (3.31)
Hence,
fZ(z) =


pApB
pA+pB
e−pAz, z ≥ 0
pApB
pA+pB
epBz, z < 0.
(3.32)
Naive Estimator
The naive estimator uses tˆ0 = t1 − 1 to estimate t0. Thus, the probability of error detection
is
PrNE(error) = Pr(t1A − 1 > t1B − 1) = Pr(δ0A > τ + δ0B), (3.33)
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where τ = t0B−t0A, the time interval between the infection of host A and host B; and τ > 0.
We then have
PrNE(error) = Pr(Z > τ)
= pB
pA+pB
e−pAτ . (3.34)
Note that another way to derive PrNE(error) is based on the memoryless property of the
exponential distribution and Pr(δ0A > δ0B) = pB/(pA + pB), i.e.,
PrNE(error) = Pr(δ0A > τ + δ0B) = Pr(δ0A > τ)Pr(δ0A > δ0B), (3.35)
which leads to the same result.
Proposed Estimators
We assume that Darknet observes a sufficient number of scans from hosts A and B so that
our proposed estimators can estimate µA (i.e., 1pA ) and µB (i.e., 1pB ) accurately. Then, the
probability of error detection of our proposed estimators is
PrMME(error) = PrMLE(error) = PrLRE(error)
= Pr(t1A − 1pA > t1B −
1
pB
)
= Pr(Z > τ + pB−pA
pApB
)
=
∫ +∞
τ+
pB−pA
pApB
fZ(z) dz. (3.36)
When τ + pB−pA
pApB
≥ 0,
PrMME(error) =
∫ +∞
τ+
pB−pA
pApB
pApB
pA+pB
e−pAz dz
= pB
pA+pB
e
−pA
(
τ+
pB−pA
pApB
)
. (3.37)
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When τ + pB−pA
pApB
< 0,
PrMME(error) =
∫ 0
τ+
pB−pA
pApB
pApB
pA+pB
epBz dz +
∫ +∞
0
pApB
pA+pB
e−pAz dz
= 1
pA+pB
(
pA + pB − pA e
pB
(
τ+
pB−pA
pApB
))
. (3.38)
Performance Comparison
Since PrNE(error) = Pr(Z > τ) and PrMME(error) = Pr
(
Z > τ + pB−pA
pApB
)
, for a given τ
(τ > 0), comparing Equation (3.34) with Equations (3.37) and (3.38),

PrNE(error) > PrMME(error), pA < pB
PrNE(error) < PrMME(error), pA > pB.
(3.39)
Hence, it is unclear which estimator is better based on the expressions of PrNE(error) and
PrMME(error). However, we can compare the performance of our estimators with the naive
estimator through numerical analysis. We first demonstrate the probabilities of error detec-
tion (i.e., PrNE(error) and PrMME(error)) as the functions of pA and pB in Figs. 3.5 (a) and (b),
where τ = 50 time units. It can be seen that for the naive estimator, when host A hits the
Darknet with a very low probability, PrNE(error) is almost 1 regardless of pB. However, the
worst case of PrMME(error) is slightly above 0.6 when pB is small. Moreover, we show the
probabilities of error detection as a function of τ with a given pair of pA and pB in Fig.s 3.5
(c) and (d). The performance of two estimators improves as τ increases. Furthermore, the
sum of the integral
∫ 500
0
PrNE(error) dτ of the two figures is 41.43, while the sum of the inte-
gral
∫ 500
0
PrMME(error) dτ in these two cases is only 34.76. This shows that the improvement
gain of our estimators over the naive estimator when pA < pB outweighs the degradation
suffered when pA > pB, indicating the benefits of applying our estimators.
Note that pA, pB, and τ can be random variables. To evaluate the overall performance
of each estimator, we consider the average probability of error detection over pA, pB, and τ ,
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Figure 3.5: Numerical analysis of Pr(error).
i.e.,
E [Pr(error)] =
∫
τ
∫
pA
∫
pB
Pr(error) · f(pA, pB, τ) d pB d pA dτ. (3.40)
Since pA, pB, and τ are independent,
f(pA, pB, τ) = f(pA) · f(pB) · f(τ). (3.41)
We then consider some cases in which we are interested and apply the numerical integration
toolbox in Matlab [57] to calculate the triple integration. For example, we assume that sA
and sB follow a normal distribution N(u, σ2) and τ is uniform over (0, τ1]. We find that
when u, σ2, and τ1 are set to realistic values, we always have
E [PrNE(error)] > E [PrMME(error)]. (3.42)
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That is, our proposed estimators perform better than NE on average, which will further be
verified in Section 3.3 through simulations.
Moreover, in Fig. 3.5(a), it can be seen that the majority of detection error for the
naive estimator comes from the case that pA < pB. Specifically, it is obvious to derive the
following theorem from Equations (3.34) and (3.37).
Theorem 3.2.1 When pA < pB,
PrMME(error) = PrMLE(error) = PrLRE(error)
= PrNE(error) · e
−
(
1−
pA
pB
)
. (3.43)
That is, the error probability is decreased by a factor of e−
(
1−
pA
pB
)
by applying our estimators
as compared with the naive estimator.
3.3 Simulations and Verification
In this section, we use simulations to verify our analytical results and then apply estimators
to identify the patient zero or the hitlist. As far as we know, there is no publicly available
data to show the real worm infection sequence. That is, there is no dataset available with
the real infection sequence to serve as the ground truth and a comparison basis for per-
formance evaluation. Therefore, we apply empirical simulations to provide the simulated
worm infection time and infection sequence.
3.3.1 Estimating the Host Infection Time
We evaluate the performance of estimators in estimating the host infection time. For the
case of random-scanning worms, we simulate the behavior of a host infected by the Code
Red v2 worm. The host is infected at time tick 0 and uses a constant scanning rate. The time
unit is set to 20 seconds. The Darknet records hit times during an observation window. The
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of MSE(tˆ0) for random-scanning worms.
results are averaged over 100 independent runs. Fig. 3.6 compares the performance (i.e.,
MSE of estimators for t0) of NE, MME, and LRE. In our simulations, we use a Darknet size
of 220, a scanning rate of 358 scans/min, and an observation window size of 800 mins as
default values. Moreover, when a parameter is studied and varied, we keep other parameters
unchanged. Specifically, we consider the effects of the Darknet size, the scanning rate, and
the observation window size on the performance of the estimators. It is observed that for
all cases, our proposed estimators have a better performance (smaller MSE) than the naive
estimator in estimating the host infection time. Specifically, the simulation results verify
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of MSE(tˆ0) for localized-scanning worms.
Theorem 3.1.1, i.e., that the MSE of our estimators is almost half of that of the naive
estimator, when the observation window size is sufficiently large (e.g., > 200 mins).
Next, we study a host infected by localized-scanning worms and adopt the same sim-
ulation parameters and settings as the above. The main difference is that here the host
preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the “local” address space with a probability
pa. In Fig. 3.7, we compare MSE(tˆ0) for different estimators. The default parameter values
are a Darknet size of 220, a scanning rate of 358 scans/min, an observation window size
of 800 mins, and a pa value of 0.7. We find that the results are similar to those for the
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random-scanning case shown in Fig. 3.6. That is, the MSE of our estimators is almost half
of that of the naive estimator. On the other hand, it can be seen that the MSE(tˆ0) in Fig.s
3.7 (a)-(c) is larger for all cases than that in Fig. 3.6 since the localized-scanning worm hits
the Darknet less frequently than the random-scanning worm.
3.3.2 Estimating the Worm Infection Sequence
We evaluate the performance of our algorithms in estimating the worm infection sequence
and simulate the propagation of the Code Red v2 worm. Specifically, the simulator consid-
ers a discrete-time system and mimics the random-scanning behavior of infected hosts dur-
ing each discrete time interval. Moreover, the parameter setting is based on the Code Red
v2 worm’s characteristics. The Code Red worm has a vulnerable population of 360,000.
Different infected hosts may have different scanning rates. Thus, we assign a scanning rate
(scans/min) from a normal distribution N(358, σ2) to a newly infected host. Moreover, we
start our simulation at time tick 0 from one infected host. The time unit is set to 20 seconds.
Detailed information about how the parameters are chosen can be found in Section VII of
[12]. Each point in Fig. 3.8 is averaged over 20 independent runs. Table 3.3 gives the
results of a sample run with a Darknet size of 220, an observation window size of 1,600
mins, and σ = 110. In the table, Si is the actual infection sequence (i.e., Si = i), whereas
Sˆi is the estimated sequence. In this example, we find that MME and LRE can pinpoint the
patient zero successfully, while NE fails.
To compare the performance of estimators quantitatively, we consider a simple l1 se-
quence distance, i.e.,
D =
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣Si − Sˆi
∣∣∣, (3.44)
where N is the length of the infection sequence considered, Si is the actual infection se-
quence (i.e., Si = i), and Sˆi is the estimated sequence. Note that the smaller the sequence
distance is, the better the estimator performance will be. Fig. 3.8 compares the perfor-
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the sequence distance for random-scanning worms.
mance of different estimators for random-scanning worms, where the default parameter
values are a Darknet size of 220, a scanning rate standard deviation of 115, an observation
window size of 1,600 mins, and a length of the infection sequence considered of 1,000.
Specifically, Fig. 3.8(a) shows the sequence distances of NE, MME, and LRE with vary-
ing Darknet sizes from 219 to 224. It is observed that when the Darknet size increases, the
performance of all estimators improves dramatically. Moreover, the performance of MME
and LRE is always better than that of NE. For example, when the Darknet size equals 219,
MME and LRE improve the inference accuracy by 24%, compared with NE. Fig. 3.8(b)
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Table 3.3: A sample run of simulations for random scanning.
Si SˆiNE SˆiMME SˆiLRE t0 tˆ0NE tˆ0MME tˆ0LRE
1 2 1 1 0 114 20 20
2 1 2 2 85 98 74 73
3 3 3 3 105 165 116 116
: : : : : : : :
520 498 533 534 593 622 589 589
521 433 488 477 594 611 581 580
: : : : : : : :
demonstrates the sequence distances of these three estimators by changing the standard de-
viation of the scanning rate (i.e., σ) from 100 to 125. It is noted that when σ increases, the
performance of all estimators deteriorates. The performance of MME and LRE, however,
is always better than that of NE. For example, when σ = 120, MME and LRE reduce the
sequence distance by 30%, compared with NE. In Fig. 3.8(c), we increase the length of the
infection sequence considered, N , from 1,000 to 11,000. It is intuitive that the sequence
distances of all estimators become larger as N increases. However, MME and LRE are
always better than NE.
Next, we extend our simulator to imitate the spread of localized-scanning worms.
Specifically, we consider /8 localized-scanning worms and a centralized /8 Darknet with
224 IP addresses. We still use the Code Red v2 worm parameters and the same setting as
random scanning, except that the observation window size is 1,000 mins (this is because
localized-scanning worms spread faster). The distribution of vulnerable hosts is extracted
from the dataset provided by DShield [58]. DShield obtains the information of vulnera-
ble hosts by aggregating logs from more than 1,600 intrusion detection systems distributed
throughout the Internet. Specifically, we use the dataset with port 80 (HTTP) that is ex-
ploited by the Code Red v2 worm to generate the vulnerable-hosts distribution. Each point
in Fig. 3.9 is averaged over 20 independent runs. Fig. 3.9 compares the sequence distances
of different estimators for localized scanning. Specifically, the results in Fig. 3.9(a) and (b)
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of the sequence distance for localized-scanning worms.
are similar to those in Fig. 3.8(b) and (c). In Fig. 3.9(c), we compare the performance of
the estimators by increasing pa from 0 to 0.7. Here, N = 1,000, and σ = 115. It is observed
that the sequence distances of all estimators increase as pa becomes larger. However, our
estimators are always better than NE. For example, when pa = 0.5, MME and LRE increase
the inference accuracy by 27%, compared with NE.
Therefore, our proposed estimators perform much better than the naive estimator for
both random-scanning and localized-scanning worms in estimating the worm infection se-
quence.
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3.3.3 Identifying the Patient Zero or the Hitlist
A smart worm can assign lower scanning rates to the initially infected host(s) and higher
scanning rates to other infected hosts. In this way, the Darknet might observe later infected
hosts first, and therefore the smart worm would weaken the performance of the naive esti-
mator. In Fig. 3.10, we compare the performance of estimators in identifying the hitlist of
such a smart worm. Specifically, the worm assigns scanning rates from N(50, 202) to the
host(s) on the hitlist and scanning rates from N(358, 1102) to other infected hosts. Then,
we calculate the percentage of the host(s) on the hitlist that are successfully identified by
an estimator. For example, if the size of the hitlist is 100 and 50 hosts that belong to the
hitlist are identified among the first 100 hosts of the estimated infection sequence, the suc-
cessful identification percentage of the estimator is 50%. The results are averaged over 100
independent runs. Fig. 3.10(a) shows the case of random scanning, where the Darkent size
is 220 and the observation window size is 1,000 mins. It is seen that our estimators have a
higher successful identification percentage and a smaller variance than the naive estimator.
For instance, when the size of the hitlist is 1 (i.e., the worm starts from the patient zero),
MME and LRE can pinpoint the patient zero around 80% of the time, while NE can detect
it only 70% of the time. When the size of the hitlist is 10 or 100, compared with NE, our
proposed estimators increase the number of successfully identified hosts from 5 to 7 or 51
to 72, and reduce the variance from 2.6 to 1.6 or 23 to 13, respectively. Fig. 3.10(b) shows
the results of localized scanning, where the Darkent size is 224, pa = 0.7, and all other pa-
rameters are the same as the case of random scanning. The results are similar to those in
Fig. 3.10(a). Therefore, the simulation results demonstrate that our proposed estimators are
much more effective in identifying the histlist of the smart worm than the naive estimator.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison of estimators in identifying the patient zero or the hitlist.
3.4 Discussions
In this section, we first analyze the chance that Darknet misses an infected host and then
discuss the limitations and the extensions of our proposed estimators.
3.4.1 Host Missing Probability
By applying Darknet observations, we have made an assumption: The infected host will hit
the Darknet. Then, an intuitive question would be: What is the probability that the Darknet
misses an infected host within a given observation window?
We consider the case of localized scanning and regard random scanning as a special
case of localized scanning when pa = 0. The probability for a scan from an infected host to
hit the Darknet is (1−pa) ·ω/Ω; and then the probability that the Darknet misses observing
the host in a time unit is (1− (1− pa) · ω/Ω)s. Thus, the host missing probability (i.e., the
probability that the Darknet misses the infected host in a k time units observation window)
is
PrLS(missing) =
(
1− (1− pa) ·
ω
Ω
)s·k
. (3.45)
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Figure 3.11: Host missing probability.
In Fig. 3.11, we show the host missing probability as the observation window size
changes. In this example, we set ω = 224, time unit = 20 seconds, and s = 358 scans/min.
We find that if pa = 0.7, the infected host will almost hit the Darknet for sure when the
observation window size is larger than 20 mins. If pa = 0, which is the case of random
scanning, a 5-min observation window is sufficient to guarantee the capture of the infected
host. Therefore, in our previous analysis and simulation, the assumption that the Dark-
net can observe scans from the infected host, especially at the early stage, is reasonable.
Moreover, our estimator can still work even for self-stopping worms [59].
3.4.2 Estimator Limitations and Extensions
Our proposed estimators are built based on some assumptions listed in Section 3.1. At-
tackers that design future worms may exploit these assumptions to weaken the accuracy
of our estimators. In the following, we discuss some limitations of our estimators and the
potential extensions.
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Darknet Avoidance
The majority of active worms up to date do not attempt to avoid the detection of Darknet.
As a result, CAIDA’s network telescopes have been observing many active Internet worms
such as Code Red, Slammer, Witty, and even recently the Conficker worm (also known as
the April Fool’s worm). Most worms apply random scanning and localized scanning, and
Darknet can observe the traffic from such worms.
Recent work, however, has shown that attackers can potentially detect the locations of
Darknet or network sensors [60]. Thus, a future worm can be specially designed to avoid
scanning the address space of the Darknet. The countermeasure against such an intelligent
worm is to apply the distributed Darknet instead of the centralized Darknet [17]. That
is, unused IP addresses in many subnets are used to observe worm traffic, which is then
reported to a collection center for further processing. A prototype of distributed Darknet
has been designed and evaluated in [61].
Scanning Rate Variation
Although there have been no observations of worms that use scanning rate variation mech-
anisms (i.e., the scanning rate of an individual infected host is time-variant) [53], future
worms may employ such schemes to invalidate our basic assumption and thus weaken the
performance of our estimators. Changing the scanning rate, however, introduces additional
complexity to worm design and can slow down worm spreading. Moreover, if the change
of scanning rates is relatively slow, our estimators can be enhanced with the change-point
detection [62] to detect and track when the scanning rate has a significant change and then
apply the early observations to derive the infection time of an infected host.
37
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8 x 10
6
Worm Packet Loss Rate (rloss)
S
eq
u
en
ce
D
is
ta
n
ce
 
 
DNE
DMME
DLRE
Figure 3.12: Comparison of the sequence distance varying with the worm packet loss rate.
Measurement Errors
The measurement errors can affect the performance of estimators. There are two types of
measurement errors. The false positive denotes that Darknet incorrectly classifies the traffic
from a benign host as worm traffic, whereas the false negative is that Darknet incorrectly
classifies worm traffic as benign traffic or misses worm traffic due to congestion or device
malfunction.
For the false positives, most of time we can distinguish worm traffic from other traf-
fic. First, our estimation techniques are used as a form of post-mortem analysis on worm
records logged by Darknet. As a result, we can limit our analysis to the records logged dur-
ing the outbreak of the worm when it is most rampant. More importantly, worm packages
always contain information about infection vectors that distinguish worm traffic from other
traffic. For example, the Witty worm uses a source port of 4,000 to attack Internet Security
Systems firewall products [16]. It is very unlikely that a benign host uses a source port of
4,000. By filtering the records based on infection vectors specific to the worm under inves-
tigation, we can eliminate most of the effects of false positives on Darknet observations.
False negatives are much harder to eliminate. A packet towards Darknet may be lost
due to congestion caused by the worm (such as the Slammer worm [22]) or the malfunc-
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tion of Darknet monitoring devices. To study the effects of false negatives, we modify our
simulator to mimic the packet loss and evaluate the performance of our estimators under
false negatives. Here we assume that the loss rate of the worm packets towards Darknet
(denoted as rloss) is the same for each infected host. Fig. 3.12 shows how the sequence
distances of different estimators vary with the worm packet loss rate. The results are aver-
aged over 20 independent runs. It is intuitive that when the packet loss rate becomes larger,
the performance of all estimators worsens. Our proposed estimators, however, always per-
form much better than NE. For example, compared with NE, our estimators (i.e., MME and
LRE) improve the inference accuracy by 28% when rloss = 0.4. A mechanism to recover
from worm-induced congestion has been proposed in [53], which estimates the packet loss
rates of infected hosts based on Darknet observations and BGP atoms. This method can be
incorporated into our estimators to enhance their robustness against worm-induced conges-
tion.
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CHAPTER 4
CHARACTERIZING INTERNET WORM SPATIAL INFECTION STRUCTURE
Modeling Internet worm infection has been focused on the macro level. Most, if not
all, mathematical models study the total number of infected hosts over time [7, 8, 9, 11, 1].
For example, Staniford et al. used a simple differential equation to estimate the global
propagation speed of the Code Red v2 worm [7], whereas Rohloff et al. applied a stochastic
model to reflect the variation of the number of infected hosts at the early stage of worm
infection [10]. The models of some key micro-level information of worm infection, such
as the infection ability of individual hosts and the underlying topology formed by worm
infection, has been investigated little.
The goal of this chapter is to bridge the gap by characterizing the spatial infection
relationship between individual infected hosts, i.e., the worm spatial infection structure.
Specifically, we reveal the key characteristics of the underlying topology formed by worm
infection, i.e., the number of children and the generation of the worm tree. To study these
two metrics analytically, we apply probabilistic modeling methods and derive the probabil-
ity distributions of the number of children and the generation through a sequential growth
model. Different from other models that characterize the dynamics of worm propagation
(e.g., the total number of infected hosts over time), our sequential growth model aims at
capturing the main features of the topology formed by worm infection (e.g., the number
of children and the generation). To the best of our knowledge, there is yet no mathemati-
cal model for characterizing the structure of the worm tree. We then verify the analytical
results through simulations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents our sequen-
tial growth model and assumptions used in analyzing the worm tree. Section 4.2 gives our
analysis on the worm tree. Section 4.3 then uses simulations to verify the analytical results
and provide observations on the worm tree using the localized-scanning method.
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Figure 4.1: An example of the worm tree.
4.1 Worm Tree and Sequential Growth Model
In this section, we provide the background on the worm tree, and present the assumptions
and the growth model.
An example of a worm tree is given in Fig. 4.1. Here, patient zero is the root and
belongs to generation 0. The tail of an arrow is from the “father” or the infector, whereas
the head of an arrow points to the “son” or the infectee. If a father belongs to generation
i, then its children lie in generation i + 1. In a worm tree with n nodes, we use Ln(i, j)
(0 ≤ i, j ≤ n − 1) to denote the number of nodes that have i children and belong to gen-
eration j. Note that
∑n−1
i=0
∑n−1
j=0 Ln(i, j) = n. We also use Cn(i) (i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1)
to denote the number of nodes that have i children and Gn(j) (j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1)
to denote the number of nodes in generation j. Moreover, Ln(i, j), Cn(i), and Gn(j) are
random variables. Thus, we define pn(i, j) = E[Ln(i,j)]n , representing the joint distribu-
tion of the number of children and the generation. Similarly, we define cn(i) = E[Cn(i)]n
to represent the marginal distribution of the number of children and gn(j) = E[Gn(j)]n to
represent the marginal distribution of the generation. Note that cn(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 pn(i, j) and
gn(j) =
∑n−1
i=0 pn(i, j).
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(a) Extreme case 1.
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(b) Extreme case 2.
Figure 4.2: Two extreme cases of worm trees.
Although we model worm infection as a tree, different worm trees can show very dif-
ferent structures. Fig. 4.2 demonstrates two extreme cases of worm trees. Specifically, in
Fig. 4.2 (a), each infected host compromises one and only one host except the last infected
host. In this case, if the total number of nodes is n, Cn(0) = 1, and Cn(1) = n− 1, which
lead to cn(0) = 1n and cn(1) =
n−1
n
≈ 1 when n is large. That is, almost each node has
one and only one child. Moreover, Gn(j) = 1, j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n − 1, which means that
gn(j) =
1
n
. Thus, the average path length is
∑n−1
j=0 j · gn(j) =
n−1
2
∼ O(n). That is, the av-
erage path length increases linearly with the number of nodes. Comparatively, Fig. 4.2 (b)
shows another case where all hosts (except patient zero) are infected by patient zero. For
the distribution of the number of children, cn(n− 1) = 1n , and cn(0) =
n−1
n
≈ 1 when n is
large, indicating that almost every node has no child. For the distribution of the generation,
gn(0) =
1
n
, and gn(1) = n−1n , which leads to that the average path length is
n−1
n
≈ 1 when
n is large. Thus, the path length is close to a constant of 1. In this chapter, we attempt to
identify the structure of the worm tree formed by Internet worm infection.
To study the worm tree analytically, in this work we make several assumptions and
considerations. First, to simplify the model, we assume that infected hosts have the same
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scanning rate. This assumption is removed in Section 4.3.2, where we use simulations to
study the effect of the variation of scanning rates on the worm tree. Second, we consider a
wide class of worms for which a new victim is compromised by each existing infected host
with equal probability. Such worms include random-scanning worms, routable-scanning
worms, importance-scanning worms, OPT-STATIC worms, and SUBOPT-STATIC worms.
Random scanning selects targets in the IPv4 address space randomly and has been the main
scanning method for both worms and botnets [7, 2]; routable scanning finds victims in the
routable IPv4 address space [63, 8]; and importance scanning probes subnets according to
the vulnerable-host distribution [54]. OPT-STATIC and SUBOPT-STATIC are optimal and
suboptimal scanning methods that are proposed in [64] to minimize the number of worm
scans required to reach a predetermined fraction of vulnerable hosts. In Section 4.3.3,
we extend our study to localized scanning, which preferentially searches for targets in the
local subnet and has also been used by real worms [65, 55]. Third, we consider the classic
susceptible→ infected (SI) model, ignoring the cases that an infected host can be cleaned
and becomes vulnerable again, or can be patched and becomes invulnerable. The SI model
assumes that once infected, a host remains infected. Such a simple model has been widely
applied in studying worm infection [7, 8, 64], and presents the worst case scenario. Fourth,
we assume that there is no re-infection. That is, if an infected host is hit by a worm scan,
this host will not be further re-infected. As a result, every infected host has one and only
one father except for patient zero, and the resulting graph formed by worm infection is a
tree. Fifth, we assume that the worm starts from one infected host, i.e., patient zero or a
hitlist size of 1. When the hitlist size is larger than 1, the underlying infection topology
is a worm forest, instead of a worm tree. Our analysis, however, can easily be extended
to model the worm forest. Finally, to simplify the analysis, we assume that no two nodes
are added to the worm tree at the same time. That is, no two vulnerable hosts are infected
simultaneously. We relax this assumption in Section 4.3 where simulations are performed.
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Based on these considerations and assumptions, the sequential growth model of a worm
tree works as follows: We consider a fixed sequence of infected hosts (i.e., nodes) v1, v2, · · ·
and inductively construct a random worm tree (Tn)n≥1, where n is the number of nodes and
T1 has only patient zero. Infecting a new host is equivalent to adding a new node into the
existing worm tree. Hence, given Tn−1, Tn is formed by adding node vn together with an
edge directed from an existing node vf to vn. According to the assumption, vf is randomly
chosen among the n−1 nodes in the tree, i.e., Pr(f = k) = 1
n−1
, k = 1, 2, · · · , n−1. Note
that such a sequential growth model and its variations have been widely used in studying
topology generators [28]. In this chapter, we apply this model to characterize worm spatial
infection strucutre.
4.2 Characterizing Internet Worm Spatial Infection Structure
In this section, we characterize the topology of the worm tree through mathematical anal-
ysis. Specifically, we first derive the joint distribution of the number of children and the
generation, i.e., pn(i, j), by applying probabilistic methods. We then use pn(i, j) to analyze
two marginal distributions, i.e., cn(i) and gn(j), and obtain their closed-form approxima-
tions. Finally, we find a closed-form approximation to pn(i, j).
4.2.1 Joint Distribution
For a worm tree with only patient zero (i.e., n = 1), since L1(0, 0) = 1 with probability 1,
p1(0, 0) = 1. Similarly, for a worm tree with n = 2, it is evident that L2(1, 0) = L2(0, 1) =
1. Thus, p2(1, 0) = p2(0, 1) = 12 . We now consider pn(i, j) (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n−1) when n ≥ 3.
Specifically, we study two cases:
(1) pn(0, j), i.e., the proportion of the number of leaves in generation j in Tn. Assume
that Tn−1 is given, and there are Ln−1(0, j) leaves in generation j and totally Gn−1(j−1) =
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∑n−2
i=0 Ln−1(i, j − 1) nodes in generation j − 1. Note that we have extended the notation
so that Gn−1(−1) = Ln−1(i,−1) = 0, 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2. When a new node vn is added, vn
becomes a leaf of Tn. If vn is connected to one of existing nodes in generation j − 1, vn
belongs to generation j; and the probability of such an event is Gn−1(j−1)
n−1
. Moreover, if a
leaf in generation j in Tn−1 connects to vn, this node is no longer a leaf and now has one
child; and the probability of this event is Ln−1(0,j)
n−1
. Therefore, we can obtain the stochastic
recurrence of Ln(0, j):
Ln(0, j) =


Ln−1(0, j) + 1, w.p. Gn−1(j−1)n−1
Ln−1(0, j)− 1, w.p. Ln−1(0,j)n−1
Ln−1(0, j), otherwise.
(4.1)
Given Tn−1 (i.e., Ln−1(0, j) and Gn−1(j−1)), the conditional expected value of Ln(0, j) is
[Ln−1(0, j) + 1]·
Gn−1(j−1)
n−1
+[Ln−1(0, j)− 1]·
Ln−1(0,j)
n−1
+Ln−1(0, j)·
[
1− Gn−1(j−1)+Ln−1(0,j)
n−1
]
,
i.e.,
E[Ln(0, j)|Tn−1] = n−2n−1Ln−1(0, j) +
1
n−1
Gn−1(j − 1). (4.2)
Applying E[Ln(0, j)] = E[E[Ln(0, j)|Tn−1]] (i.e., the law of total expectation), we obtain
E[Ln(0, j)] = n−2n−1E[Ln−1(0, j)] +
1
n−1
E[Gn−1(j − 1)]. (4.3)
Using the definitions pn(0, j) = E[Ln(0,j)]n and gn−1(j−1) =
E[Gn−1(j−1)]
n−1
=
∑n−2
i=0 pn−1(i, j − 1),
the above equation leads to
pn(0, j) =
n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1) (4.4)
= n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
∑n−2
i=0 pn−1(i, j − 1). (4.5)
(2) pn(i, j), 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Given Ln−1(i, j) and Ln−1(i − 1, j) in Tn−1, we study
Ln(i, j) in Tn. When the new node vn is added into Tn−1, vn is connected to a node with
i − 1 children and in generation j with probability Ln−1(i−1,j)
n−1
, or is connected to a node
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with i children and in generation j with probability Ln−1(i,j)
n−1
. Thus, in Tn,
Ln(i, j) =


Ln−1(i, j) + 1, w.p. Ln−1(i−1,j)n−1
Ln−1(i, j)− 1, w.p. Ln−1(i,j)n−1
Ln−1(i, j), otherwise.
(4.6)
This relationship leads to
E[Ln(i, j)|Tn−1] = n−2n−1Ln−1(i, j) +
1
n−1
Ln−1(i− 1, j). (4.7)
Therefore,
E[Ln(i, j)] = n−2n−1E[Ln−1(i, j)] +
1
n−1
E[Ln−1(i− 1, j)]. (4.8)
That is,
pn(i, j) =
n−2
n
pn−1(i, j) +
1
n
pn−1(i− 1, j). (4.9)
Summarizing the above two cases, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.1 When n ≥ 3, the joint distribution of the number of children and the gen-
eration in a worm tree Tn follows
pn(i, j) =


n−2
n
pn−1(0, j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1), i = 0
n−2
n
pn−1(i, j) +
1
n
pn−1(i− 1, j), otherwise,
(4.10)
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1.
Theorem 4.2.1 provides a way to calculate pn(i, j) recursively from p2(i, j). Fig. 4.3
shows a snapshot of pn(i, j) when n = 2000. It can be seen that when the generation
is specified (i.e., j is fixed), pn(i, j) is a monotonous function and decreases quickly as i
increases. On the other hand, when the number of children is given (i.e., i is fixed), pn(i, j)
has a bell shape. Moreover, since
∑10
i=0
∑15
j=0 pn(i, j) = 0.9976, most nodes do not have a
large number of children, and the worm tree does not have a large average path length.
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Figure 4.3: Joint distribution of the number of children and the generation.
4.2.2 Number of Children
We use pn(i, j) to derive the marginal distribution of the number of children, i.e., cn(i).
Similarly, we study two cases:
(1) cn(0), i.e., the proportion of the number of leaves in Tn. Since cn(0) =
∑n−1
j=0 pn(0, j)
and
∑n−1
j=0 gn−1(j − 1) = 1, we obtain the recursive relationship of cn(0) from Equation
(4.4):
cn(0) =
n−2
n
cn−1(0) +
1
n
. (4.11)
Moreover, note that c2(0) = 12 . If we assume that cn−1(0) =
1
2
, we can obtain by induction
that
cn(0) =
1
2
. (4.12)
This indicates that no matter how many nodes are in the worm tree, on average half of
nodes are leaves, i.e., on average 50% of infected hosts never compromise any target.
(2) cn(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. From Equation (4.9) and cn(i) =
∑n−1
j=0 pn(i, j), we find the
recurrence of cn(i) as follows
cn(i) =
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i− 1). (4.13)
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Summarizing the above two cases, we have the following theorem on the distribution
of the number of children:
Theorem 4.2.2 When n ≥ 3, the distribution of the number of children in a worm tree Tn
follows
cn(i) =


1
2
, i = 0
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i− 1), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
(4.14)
From Theorem 4.2.2, we can derive the statistical properties of the number of children
as follows.
Corollary 4.2.3 When n ≥ 1, the expectation and the variance of the number of children
are
En[C] =
∑n−1
i=0 i · cn(i) =
n−1
n
(4.15)
Varn[C] =
∑n−1
i=0 (i− En[C])
2 · cn(i) = 2−
n−1
n2
− 2Hn
n
, (4.16)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
is the n-th harmonic number [15].
The proof of Corollary 4.2.3 is given in Appendix B.1. One intuitive way to derive
En[C] is that in worm tree Tn, there are n − 1 directed edges and n nodes. Thus, the
average number of edges (i.e, the average number of children) of a node is n−1
n
. Moreover,
since Hn is O(1 + lnn), lim
n→∞
En[C] = 1, and lim
n→∞
Varn[C] = 2.
Theorem 4.2.2 also leads to a simple closed-form expression of the distribution of the
number of children when n is very large, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2.4 When n → ∞, the number of children has a geometric distribution with
parameter 1
2
, i.e.,
c(i) = lim
n→∞
cn(i) =
(1
2
)i+1
, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (4.17)
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Figure 4.4: Number of children.
Proof. It is already known that c(0) = 1
2
. When i ≥ 1, this corollary follows readily from
Equation (4.13). Since n→∞, cn−1(i) = cn(i) = c(i), which yields
c(i) = n−2
n
c(i) + 1
n
c(i− 1). (4.18)
That is,
c(i) = 1
2
c(i− 1), i ≥ 1. (4.19)
Hence, from c(0) = 1
2
, we can recursively obtain Equation (5.6).
Corollary 4.2.4 indicates that when n is very large, cn(i) decreases approximately ex-
ponentially with a decay constant of ln 2 as the number of children increases. We further
study when both n and i are finite and large, how cn(i) varies with n, i.e., how the tail of the
distribution of the number of children changes with n. First, note that c3(0) = 12 , c3(1) =
1
3
,
and c3(2) = 16 . Thus, from Equation (4.13), we can prove by induction that cn(i) (n ≥ 3)
is a decreasing function of i, i.e., cn(i) < cn(i − 1), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Next, putting this
inequality into Equation (4.13), we have cn(i) > n−1n cn−1(i). Hence, when n is very large,
n−1
n
≈ 1, and cn(i) > cn−1(i), which indicates that the tail of cn(i) increases with n. Fig.
4.4 verifies this result, showing cn(i) obtained from Theorem 4.2.2 when n = 1000, 2000,
5000, and 20000, as well as the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 obtained from
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Corollary 4.2.4. Note that the y-axis uses log-scale. It can be seen that when n increases
from 1000 to 20000, the tail of cn(i) also increases to approach the tail of the geometric
distribution. Moreover, it is shown that the geometric distribution well approximates the
distribution of the number of children when n is large.
4.2.3 Generation
Next, we derive the generation distribution (i.e., gn(j)) in a similar manner to the case of
cn(i). Using Theorem 4.2.1 and gn(j) =
∑n−1
i=0 pn(i, j), we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.5 When n ≥ 3, the distribution of the generation in a worm tree Tn follows
gn(j) =
n−1
n
gn−1(j) +
1
n
gn−1(j − 1), 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, (4.20)
where gn−1(−1) = 0.
Theorem 4.2.5 gives a method to calculate the distribution of the generation recursively.
Moreover, from Theorem 4.2.5, we can derive the statistical properties of the generation
distribution in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2.6 When n ≥ 1, the expectation and the variance of the generation are
En[G] =
∑n−1
j=0 j · gn(j) = Hn − 1. (4.21)
Varn[G] =
∑n−1
j=0 (j − En[G])
2 · gn(j) = Hn −Hn,2, (4.22)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
and Hn,2 =
∑n
i=1
1
i2
.
The proof of Corollary 4.2.6 is given in Appendix B.2. From Corollary 4.2.6, we have
some interesting observations. Since Hn is O(1 + lnn) and H∞,2 = ζ(2) = pi
2
6
≈ 1.645
is the Riemann zeta function of 2 [66], both En[G] and Varn[G] are O(1 + lnn). This
indicates that the average path length of the worm tree (i.e., En[G]) increases approxi-
mately logarithmically with n. Moreover, when n → ∞, lim
n→∞
En[G] − lnn = γ − 1, and
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lim
n→∞
Varn[G] − lnn = γ − ζ(2), where γ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant [67].
Therefore, when n is large, En[G] ≈ Varn[G]. Furthermore, we can use Theorem 4.2.5 to
obtain a closed-form approximation to gn(j) as follows.
Corollary 4.2.7 When n is very large, the generation distribution gn(j) can be approxi-
mated by a Poisson distribution with parameter λn = En[G] = Hn − 1. That is,
gn(j) ≈
λ
j
n
j!
e−λn , 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. (4.23)
Proof. We prove this corollary by applying z-transform. If a random variable X follows a
Poisson distribution with parameter λ,
Pr(X = k) =
λk
k!
e−λ, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (4.24)
Using z-transform, we have
X(z) =
∞∑
k=0
Pr(X = k)z−k = eλ(z
−1−1). (4.25)
Meanwhile, using Equation (4.20) in Theorem 4.2.5, we find the z-transform of gn(j)
Yn(z) =
∑n−1
j=0 gn(j)z
−j =
(
1 + z
−1−1
n
)
Yn−1(z). (4.26)
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Note that when x → 0, ex ≈ 1 + x. Thus, when n is very large, 1 + z−1−1
n
≈ exp((z−1 −
1)/n). That is,
Yn(z) ≈ e
z−1−1
n Yn−1(z). (4.27)
Using Y1(z) = 1, we can recursively obtain
Yn(z) ≈ e
(z−1−1)
∑n
i=2
1
i = e(Hn−1)(z
−1−1). (4.28)
Therefore, comparing Equations (4.25) and (4.28), we find that gn(j) can be approximated
by the Poisson distribution with parameter Hn − 1 as in Equation (4.23).
Fig. 4.5 verifies Corollary 4.2.7, showing gn(j) obtained from Theorem 4.2.5 when
n = 1000, 2000, 5000, and 20000, as well as the Poisson distribution with parameter En[G].
It can be seen that when n is large, the Poisson distribution fits the generation distribution
closely.
4.2.4 Approximation to the Joint Distribution
Finally, we derive a closed-form approximation to the joint distribution pn(i, j). From
Equation (4.9), we can see that when n→∞, pn(i, j) = pn−1(i, j), which yields
pn(i, j) =
1
2
pn(i− 1, j). (4.29)
Hence, we can obtain
pn(i, j) =
(
1
2
)i
pn(0, j) ≈
(
1
2
)i+1
gn(j). (4.30)
Since when n is very large, gn(j) follows closely the Poisson distribution as in Corollary
4.2.7,
pn(i, j) ≈
(
1
2
)i+1
· λ
j
n
j!
e−λn , 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n− 1, (4.31)
where λn = Hn−1. The above derivation also shows that when n is very large, the number
of children and the generation are almost independent random variables.
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Figure 4.6: Joint distribution.
Fig. 4.6 shows the parity plot of the approximation to the joint distribution when n =
2000. In the figure, the x-axis is the actual pn(i, j) obtained from Theorem 4.2.1, and the
y-axis is the approximated pn(i, j) from Equation (4.31), where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 30. It can be
seen that most points are on or near the diagonal line, indicating that the approximation to
the joint distribution is reasonable.
4.3 Simulations and Verification
In this section, we study the worm spatial infection structure through simulations. As far as
we know, there is no publicly available data to show the real worm tree and verify our ana-
lytical results. Moreover, real experiments in a controlled environment are impractical for
this study since the closed-form approximations are derived based on the assumption that
the number of nodes is very large. Therefore, we apply empirical simulations. Specifically,
we first simulate the spatial infection structure of the Code Red v2 worm and then study
the effects of important parameters on the worm tree. Finally, we extend our simulation to
localized-scanning worms.
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Figure 4.7: Simulating the spatial infection structure of the Code Red v2 worm.
4.3.1 Code Red v2 Worm Verification
Similarly to Chapter 3, we simulate the propagation of the Code Red v2 worm by using
and extending the simulator in [68]. Here, the vulnerable population is n0 = 360, 000, and
a newly infected host is assigned with a scanning rate of 358 scans/min. We then extend
the simulator to track the worm spatial infection structure by adding the information of the
number of children and the generation to each infected host. Moreover, we set the time unit
to 20 seconds and start our simulation at time tick 0 with patient zero. Note that we remove
the assumption used in the sequential growth model that no two hosts are compromised at
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the same time. That is, multiple hosts can be compromised at one time tick. Moreover, all
new victims of the current time tick start scanning at the next time tick. The simulation
results (mean ± standard deviation) are obtained from 100 independent runs with different
seeds and are presented in Fig. 4.7.
Fig. 4.7(a) shows the distribution of the number of children, comparing the simulation
results of cn(i) for n = n0/4, n0, and 4n0 with the geometric distribution obtained from
Corollary 4.2.4. Note that the y-axis uses the log-scale. The vertical dotted line represents
the standard deviation that goes into the negative territory. It can be seen that the distribu-
tion of the number of children can be well approximated by the geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5. This implies that cn(i) decreases approximately exponentially with a decay
constant of ln 2. Specifically, in all three cases, on average 50.0% of the infected hosts do
not have children, about 98.4% of them have no more than five children, and 0.1% of them
have no less than ten children. We also calculate the expectation and the variance of the
number of children from the simulation and find that they are identical to the analytical
results obtained from Corollary 4.2.3. Fig. 4.7(b) demonstrates the generation distribution,
comparing the simulation results of gn(j) for n = n0/4, n0, and 4n0 with the Poisson distri-
butions with parameter En[G] = Hn − 1 obtained from Corollary 4.2.7. It can be seen that
the simulation results of gn(j) closely follow the Poisson distributions for all three cases.
Hence, simulation results verify that the average path length of the worm tree increases
approximately logarithmically with the total number of infected hosts. Moreover, we also
compute the expectation and the variance of the generation in simulations and verify the
analytical results in Corollary 4.2.6. Fig. 4.7(c) compares the measured joint distribution
from simulations with the approximated joint distribution from Equation (4.31) by using
the parity plot. It can be seen that most points are on or near the diagonal line, indicating
that the approximation works well.
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4.3.2 Effects of Worm Parameters
Next, we extend our simulator to examine the effects of three important parameters of worm
propagation on the worm tree: the scanning rate, the scanning rate standard deviation, and
the hitlist size. When a parameter is studied and varied, we set other parameters to the
parameters of the Code Red v2 worm as used in Section 4.3.1. The simulation results are
obtained from 100 independent simulation runs and are shown in Fig. 4.8.
Fig.s 4.8(a) and (b) show the effect of varying the scanning rate s (scans/min) from 158
to 558 on the distributions of the number of children and the generation. Here, the scanning
rate is set to a fixed value for every infected host, i.e., the scanning rate standard deviation
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Figure 4.8: Effects of s, σ, and the hitlist size on cn(i) and gn(j).
is 0. The figures also plot the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 and the Poisson
distribution with parameter Hn0−1 for reference. It can be seen that the scanning rate does
not affect the worm tree structure.
Fig.s 4.8(c) and (d) demonstrate the effect of the variation of the scanning rates among
different hosts (i.e., σ). In our simulation, a newly infected host is assigned with a scanning
rate (scans/min) from a normal distribution N(358, σ2). The figures show the simulation
results when σ = 0, 100, and 200. It can be seen that while the scanning rate standard
derivation σ has no effect on the generation distribution, it does affect the distribution of
the number of children. Specifically, when σ increases, the tail of cn(i) moves upward from
the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. This is because when σ becomes larger, the
variation of the scanning rate among infected hosts is greater. That is, there are more hosts
with high scanning rates and also more hosts with low scanning rates. As a result, those
hosts with high scanning rates tend to infect a large number of hosts, making the tail of
cn(i) move upward. However, it is also observed that when σ is not very large (the case for
real worms), the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 is still a good approximation.
In Fig.s 4.8(e) and (f), we show the effect of the hitlist size on the worm tree. As pointed
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out in Section 4.1, when the hitlist size is greater than 1, the underlying infection topology
is a worm forest with the number of trees equal to the hitlist size. Moreover, in a worm
forest, it is intuitive that each tree is a smaller version of the single worm tree of hitlist size
1 and has fewer nodes. Hence, it is not surprising to see that in Fig. 4.8(f), the generation
distribution moves leftward when the hitlist size increases. However, the generation distri-
bution can still be well approximated by the Poisson distribution with parameter Hnh − 1,
where nh is the average number of nodes in a tree. Moreover, since in each tree the distri-
bution of the number of children can be approximated by the geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5, in the worm forest cn(i) still follows closely the same distribution.
4.3.3 Localized Scanning
Finally, we extend our simulation study to the infection tree of localized-scanning worms.
Different from random scanning, localized scanning preferentially searches for targets in
the “local” address space [7]. As a result, when a new node is added to the worm tree,
it connects to one of the existing nodes that are in the same “local” address space with a
higher probability. That is, the growth model is no longer uniform attachment as studied in
Section 4.2. For simplicity, in this work we only consider the /l localized scanning [55]:
• Local scanning: pa(0 ≤ pa < 1) of the time, a “local” IP address with the same first
l (0 ≤ l ≤ 32) bits as the attacking host is chosen as the target.
• Global scanning: 1− pa of the time, a random address is chosen.
Note that random scanning can be regarded as a special case of localized scanning when
pa = 0. Moreover, if local scanning is selected, it can be regarded as random scanning in
a local /l subnet. It has been shown that since the vulnerable-hosts distribution is highly
uneven, localized scanning can spread a worm much faster than random scanning [65].
58
0 5 10 15 20 25
1.0E−6
1.0E−4
0.01
0.5
Number of children (i)
c n
(i
)
 
 
Simulation (pa = 0)
Simulation (pa = 0.3)
Simulation (pa = 0.6)
Geometric
(a) Number of children.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
0.05
0.1
0.13
Generation (j)
g n
(j
)
 
 
Simulation (pa = 0)
Simulation (pa = 0.3)
Simulation (pa = 0.6)
Poisson (λ0n = Hn − 1)
Poisson(λ0.3n = E
0.3
n [G])
Poisson(λ0.6n = E
0.6
n [G])
(b) Generation.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Measured joint distribution
A
p
p
ro
x
im
at
ed
jo
in
t
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
on
(c) Joint distribution (pa = 0.6).
Figure 4.9: Simulating the spatial infection structure of the localized-scanning worm.
We extend our simulator to imitate the spread of localized-scanning worms. We extract
the distribution of vulnerable hosts in /l subnets from the dataset provided by DShield
[58, 69]. Specifically, we use the dataset in [69] with port 80 (HTTP) that is exploited
by the Code Red worm to generate the vulnerable-host distribution. Moreover, we use
similar parameters as in Section 4.3.1 (e.g., n = 360, 000, s = 358 scans/min, σ = 0,
and hitlist = 1) and set the subnet level to 8 (i.e., l = 8). The results are obtained from
100 independent simulation runs and are shown in Fig. 4.9. For each run, patient zero is
randomly chosen from vulnerable hosts.
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Fig. 4.9(a) compares the simulation results of the distributions of the number of children
(i.e., cn(i)) when pa = 0, 0.3, and 0.6 with the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. It
is surprising that cn(i) of localized-scanning worms can still be well approximated by the
geometric distribution. That is, the majority of nodes have few children, whereas a small
portion of compromised hosts infect a large number of hosts. An intuitive explanation is
given as follows. From Fig. 4.7(a), it can be seen that the total number of nodes has a
minor effect on cn(i). Hence, if in a /8 subnet the majority of vulnerable hosts are infected
through local scanning, it is expected that cn(i) of these hosts still closely follows the
geometric distribution since the local scanning can be regarded as random scanning inside
a /8 subnet. Therefore, both local infection and global infection lead cn(i) towards the
geometric distribution with parameter 0.5. On the other hand, it can also be seen that when
pa increases, the tail of cn(i) moves slightly downward. This is because as pa increases,
more vulnerable hosts are infected through local scanning. Hence, it is more difficult for
an infected host to find targets after vulnerable hosts in this host’s local subnet have been
exhausted. As a result, when pa increases, fewer nodes can have a large number of children.
Fig. 4.9(b) demonstrates that the generation distribution of localized-scanning worms
(i.e., gn(j)) can be well approximated by the Poisson distribution for the cases of pa = 0,
0.3, and 0.6. The Poisson parameter, however, depends not only on n, but also on pa. We
further define λpan = Epan [G] as the expectation of the generation for a localized-scanning
worm with parameter pa. Here, Epan [G] can be easily estimated from the simulation results
of gn(j). Fig. 4.9(c) further shows the parity plot of the simulated joint distribution and the
approximated joint distribution from Equation (4.31) when pa = 0.6, indicating that the
approximation is reasonable.
Moreover, Fig. 4.10 shows the effect of the subnet level (i.e., l) on the distribution of the
number of children (i.e., cn(i)). It can be seen that when l increases, the tail of cn(i) moves
downward. The reason is similar to the argument used in Fig. 4.9(a), i.e., as l increases,
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Figure 4.10: Effect of the subnet level (pa = 0.6).
fewer nodes can infect a large number of children. However, the figure also demonstrates
that the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 is still a good approximation to cn(i),
especially when the number of children is not large.
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CHAPTER 5
EVALUATING P2P-BASED BOTNETS FORMED BY WORM INFECTION
A botnet is a zombie network controlled by a malicious attacker called the botmaster
and is capable of sending denial-of-service attacks, producing spams, and stealing financial
information. For example, the Storm botnet affected tens of millions of hosts and was used
for spam emails and distributed DoS attacks in 2007 [35]. Therefore, botnets have become
one of top threats to the Internet.
There are two major types of botnets: IRC-based botnets and P2P-based botnets. While
IRC-based botnets require central servers for command delivery, P2P-based botnets make
use of peer-to-peer systems and can form different command communication networks
such as random graphs or power-law topologies [16]. As a result, P2P-based botnets are
more resilient to defenses and have plagued the Internet [36]. In this chapter, we consider a
P2P-based botnet formed by worm scanning/infection. That is, once a host infects another
host, they become peers in the resulting P2P-based botnet. Note that P2P-based botnets
formed by worm infection are a real threat. For example, Conficker C uses random scan-
ning to locate peers and forms a P2P botnet through scan-based peer discovery [5, 6]. Thus,
the way that Conficker C builds the botnet is in principle the same as worm infection.
Our observations on the worm spatial infection structure in Chapter 4 have important
applications on Conficker C like P2P-based botnets. For example, we have found that
the generation distribution closely follows the Poisson distribution and the average path
length increases approximately logarithmically with the number of nodes. This average
path length reflects the delay or the effort for a botmaster to deliver a command to all bots
in a P2P-based botnet like Conficker C, and our results show that the botnet is scalable
and can efficiently forward commands to a large number of bots. In this chapter, we further
study other aspects of a Conficker C like P2P-based botnet for both defenders and attackers.
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The goal of this chapter is to evaluate bot detection strategies and effects of user de-
fenses in P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection. Specifically, we first apply the
observations of the number of children in Chapter 4 on a Conficker C like P2P-based bot-
net to study efficient bot detection strategies. We then further extend the worm spatial
infection structure to investigate the P2P-based botnet topologies under user patching and
cleaning through simulations.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 evaluates bot detec-
tion methods and studies potential countermeasures by future botnets. Section 5.2 evaluates
the effect of user defenses on the P2P-based botnet structure, and further studies effects of
worm re-infection against user countermeasures.
5.1 Evaluating Bot Detection Strategies
In this section, we evaluate efficient bot detection methods by applying the observations of
the number of children in Chapter 4 and then study a potential countermeasure by future
botnets.
5.1.1 Bot Detection Strategies
In a P2P-based botnet formed by worm scanning/infection (e.g., Fig. 5.1), when a defender
captures an infected host x in a botnet, the defender can process the historic records inside
the host or monitor the traffic going into or out of the host, and will potentially detect other
infected hosts such as the father (host y) and the children (host z) of the infected host x.
Then, our question is that if a defender can only access a small portion of nodes in a botnet,
how many bots will be detected by the defender. Moreover, inspired by the random removal
and targeted removal methods used in analyzing the robustness of a topology [37], here we
study two bot detection strategies:
• Random detection: Access bots randomly.
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Figure 5.1: Bot detection in P2P-base botnet formed by worm infection.
• Targeted detection: Access bots that have the largest number of children.
Analytically, we suppose that a defender can access a small ratio of bots in a botnet.
We assume that an accessed bot exposes itself, its father, and its children to the defender.
To simplify the analysis, we also assume that the accessed bot ratio, A, is a power of 0.5
and all exposed nodes are different nodes. We then calculate the average percentages of
exposed bots by random detection and targeted detection.
Since from Corollary 4.2.3 a randomly selected node has approximately one child, the
average percentage of bots that can be exposed by random detection is then
DR = 3A. (5.1)
For targeted detection, since the nodes with the largest number of children are chosen
and the number of children follows asymptotically a geometric distribution with parameter
0.5 as shown in Corollary 4.2.4,
A =
∑
i≥d cn(i) =
∑∞
i=d
(
1
2
)i+1
=
(
1
2
)d
, (5.2)
where d is the smallest number of children of accessed nodes. That is, d = − log2 A.
Therefore, the average percentage of exposed nodes by targeted detection is
DT =
∑∞
i=d (2 + i) · cn(i) = (d+ 3)
(
1
2
)d
= A(3− log2 A). (5.3)
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Figure 5.2: Random and targeted detection.
Compared with random detection, targeted detection can expose (−A log2 A) × n more
nodes. For example, if A = 1
64
, on average random detection can detect 4.69% of nodes,
whereas targeted detection can expose 14.06% of bots.
We simulate a P2P-based botnet formed through worm infection by using our simulator
in Section 4.3.1. We then extend the simulator to study the effectiveness of random and
targeted detection strategies. Fig. 5.2 shows the simulation results over 100 independent
runs for both strategies, as well as the analytical results from Equations (5.1) and (5.3),
when A = 1
64
,
1
32
, and 1
16
. It can be seen that the analytical results slightly overestimate
the exposed host percentage. This is because in our analysis we ignore the case that two
exposed nodes can be duplicate. Fig. 5.2 also demonstrates that targeted detection performs
much better than random detection. For example, in our simulation, when A = 3.125%,
9.10% of the bots are exposed under random detection, whereas 22.36% of the bots are
detected under targeted detection. Therefore, when a small portion of bots are examined,
the botnets formed by worm infection are robust to random detection, but are relatively
vulnerable to targeted detection.
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5.1.2 A Countermeasure by Future Botnets
To counteract the targeted detection method, an intuitive way for botnets is to limit the
maximum number of children for each node. That is, set a small number m. Once an
infected host has compromised m other hosts, this host stops scanning. In this way, there
is no node with a large number of children. Moreover, the infected hosts can self-stop
scanning, potentially reducing the worm traffic [59].
To analyze the robustness of such botnets against targeted detection, we extend Corol-
lary 4.2.4 to obtain an approximated distribution of the number of children in a botnet with
the countermeasure:
cn(i) =


(
1
2
)i+1
, i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , m− 1
(
1
2
)m
, i = m.
(5.4)
The distribution is based on the observation that those nodes having more than m children
in a botnet without the countermeasure can now have only m children. Hence, the expected
percentage of exposed nodes under targeted detection can be calculated:
D′T =


(m+ 2) · A, A ≤
(
1
2
)m
A(3− log2 A)−
(
1
2
)m
, A >
(
1
2
)m
.
(5.5)
Compared with DT in Equation (5.3), D′T is smaller. This means that under the counter-
measure the number of exposed nodes can be reduced significantly. For example, when
m = 3 and A = 1
64
, DT =
9
64
, and D′T = 564 .
We then extend our simulation in Section 5.1.1 to simulate the worm tree generated
using the above countermeasure and evaluate its performance against targeted detection.
Fig. 5.3(a) shows the distribution of the number of children when m = 2, 3, 4, and 5.
It can be seen that except for m = 2, cn(i) is well approximated by Equation (5.4). For
m = 2, since an infected host stops scanning when it has hit two vulnerable hosts, leaves in
the worm tree have more chances to recruit a child. Fig. 5.3(b) demonstrates the expected
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Figure 5.3: A worm countermeasure via limiting the maximum number of children.
percentage of exposed nodes (i.e., D′T ), when A = 164 , 132 , and 116 , and m = 2, 3, 4, and
5. It can be seen that D′T follows approximately the analytical results in Equation (5.5).
Moreover, the expected percentage of exposed nodes under the countermeasure is reduced
significantly. For example, when A = 1
32
, the percentage is reduced from 22.36% without
the countermeasure to 19.80%, 15.99%, 12.58%, and 9.38% when m = 5, 4, 3, and 2,
respectively.
On the other hand, since not every infected host keeps scanning the targets, the coun-
termeasure can potentially slow down the speed of worm infection. Thus, we also simulate
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the propagation speed of worms that limit the maximum number of children and plot the
results in Fig. 5.3(c) for m = 2, 3, 4, and 5, as well as the original worm without the coun-
termeasure. It can be seen that except for m = 2, the worm does not slow down much. But
even when m = 2, the worm can infect most vulnerable hosts within 17 hours. Moreover,
Fig.s 5.3(b) and (c) demonstrate the tradeoff between the efficiency of worm infection and
the robustness of the formed botnet topology. That is, a worm with the countermeasure
spreads slower, but the resulting botnet is more robust against targeted detection.
5.2 Evaluating Effects of User Defenses
In Chapter 4, we studied the worm tree, i.e., the network structure of P2P-based botnets
formed by Internet worm infection. Specifically, we considered that once an infected host
compromises another host, they form the “father” and “child” relationship, as shown in
Fig. 5.4(a). In Chapter 4, we found through theoretical analysis that the number of children
has asymptotically a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 and the generation follows
closely a Poisson distribution. In our prior work, however, we focused on the process of
worm infection and the formation of P2P-based botnets, and did not consider the potential
countermeasures from users.
Users can respond to worm outbreaks by patching or cleaning discovered infected hosts.
For example, to counterattack the Conficker worm, Microsoft released a removal guide to
clean and patch the Conficker compromised machines after the outbreak of the worm [70].
When an infected host is patched, it becomes invulnerable; and when it is cleaned, it is no
longer infectious, but is still vulnerable to worm infection. It is obvious that a patched or
cleaned infected host can break its relationships with its father and children in the worm
tree. Specifically, when an infected host is patched or cleaned, the corresponding node
along with its associated links are removed from the worm tree. As a result, the infection
topology is no longer a tree, but a forest, as shown in Figure 5.4(b). When user countermea-
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Figure 5.4: User defenses in P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection.
sures are considered, therefore, two interesting questions arise: Are patching and cleaning
methods effective against P2P-based botnets, and how do user countermeasures affect the
botnets formed by worm infection?
To answer these questions, in this section we extend our previous work to investigate the
structure of P2P-based botnets under user countermeasures. Specifically, we consider that
a vulnerable host has three states: susceptible, infected, and removed. A susceptible host
can become infected through worm infection. An infected host can either become removed
by user patching or become susceptible again by user cleaning. Note that user cleaning
is a real method against some worms. For example, a Code-Red infected host becomes
susceptible once rebooted [21]. The effectiveness of patching and cleaning against worms
has been studied in terms of the total number of infected hosts over time [9, 71]. In this
work we focus on the effect of user countermeasures on the P2P-based botnet structure.
To characterize the key features of botnet topologies under both worm infection and user
countermeasures, we study two important metrics in particular:
• Number of peers: For a randomly selected node in the botnet topology, how many
peers (i.e., an infected host’s father and children) does it have? This metric represents
the node degree of individual hosts.
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• Botnet size: For a randomly selected tree in the forest, how many nodes does it have?
This metric represents the size of disconnected botnets after node removal.
These two metrics shed light on the robustness and the effectiveness of formed P2P-
based botnets. For example, if a very small number of hosts have a large number of peers
and the majority of hosts have none or few peers, such botnets are robust to random de-
fenses, but are vulnerable to targeted defenses (i.e., quarantining the hosts with the largest
node degree) [72, 16]. On the other hand, if each host has a similar node degree, then such
botnets are robust to both defense schemes [72, 16]. Moreover, the bigger a botnet is, the
more effective and dangerous it is [16]. For example, if the forest consists of a collection of
small isolated botnets, then its effectiveness is significantly lower than the single connected
botnet with the same total number of nodes.
5.2.1 Worm Forest and Simulation Settings
In this section, we first provide the background of the worm forest and then introduce our
simulation settings.
In Chapter 4, we studied the topology of P2P-based botnets formed by Internet worm
infection without considering user defenses. Specifically, we analyzed the tree structure
of P2P-based botnets formed by a wide class of worms starting from patient zero, for
which a new victim is compromised by each existing infected host with equal probabil-
ity. Such worms include well known random-scanning worms, routable-scanning worms,
importance-scanning worms, OPT-STATIC worms, and SUBOPT-STATIC worms. Here,
we assume that all vulnerable hosts are globally reachable and do not consider the effect
of network address translation [73]. In this section, we construct the worm forest by ran-
domly patching or cleaning hosts in the worm tree studied in [72]. Since most Internet
worms spread so fast that existing defense systems cannot respond until they have infected
most vulnerable hosts [22, 23], we assume that user patching or cleaning starts when the
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entire vulnerable population (denoted as n0) gets infected. We use rp to denote the patching
rate at which a machine is patched and becomes invulnerable, and rc to denote the clean-
ing rate at which the infection is cleaned on a machine without patching. Once patched
or cleaned, the node and its associated links are then removed from the botnet topology.
Suppose that nd hosts get patched or cleaned, and the number of remaining infected hosts
and trees are denoted as nr and tr, respectively. We use Bndn0 (i) (i = 0, 1, 2, · · · , nr − 1) to
denote the number of nodes that have i peers and T ndn0 (j) (j = 1, 2, 3, · · · , nr) to denote the
number of trees that have j nodes. Note that
∑nr−1
i=0 B
nd
n0
(i) = nr, and
∑nr
j=1 T
nd
n0
(j) = tr.
Moreover, Bndn0 (i) and T
nd
n0
(j) are random variables. Thus, we define bndn0(i) =
E[Bndn0 (i)]
nr
to
represent the distribution of the number of peers and tndn0(j) =
E[Tndn0 (j)]
tr
to represent the
distribution of the botnet size. Note that the worm tree is a special case of the worm forest
when nd = 0 (i.e., without user defenses). For such a tree, we have
lim
n0→∞
b0n0(i) = (
1
2
)i, i = 1, 2, 3, · · · (5.6)
by extending the result in Chapter 4. While our previous work only considers the number
of children, this section studies the number of peers including both the father and children.
Therefore, in P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection without user countermeasures,
the distribution of the number of peers has asymptotically a geometric distribution with
parameter 0.5, and decreases exponentially with a decay constant of ln 2. Moreover, Since
there is only one botnet, we then have the distribution of the botnet size t0n0(n0) = 1.
To investigate the P2P-based botnet topology under user patching and cleaning, in this
work we study bndn0(i) and tndn0(j) through simulations. As far as we know, there is no pub-
licly available data to show the real botnet topologies. Moreover, the complex dynamics of
patching and cleaning make the botnet structure difficult to be characterized analytically.
Therefore, we apply Monte Carlo simulation. Monte Carlo simulation is widely applied
in probability modeling and is the only viable method for the modeling of many com-
plex stochastic systems [74]. Specifically, we simulate a P2P-based botnet formed through
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worm infection by using our simulator in Section 4.3.1. We then extend the simulator to
mimic the dynamics of user countermeasures and capture the resulting botnet structure.
Specifically, after all vulnerable machines get compromised, we randomly patch or clean
hosts with rp = 2× 10−5/sec or rc = 2× 10−5/sec. We also record the information of the
number of peers and the botnet size to track the botnet structure. Moreover, we set the time
unit to 20 seconds and start our simulation at time tick 0 with patient zero. The simulation
results are obtained from 100 independent runs with different seeds.
5.2.2 P2P-based Botnet Structure under User Countermeasures
In this section, we present the P2P-based botnet structure under user countermeasures.
Specifically, we examine the distributions of the number of peers and the botnet size under
three different defense schemes: host patching only, host cleaning only, and host patch-
ing/cleaning schemes. The results are shown in Fig.s 5.5-5.7. Scaling parameters λ and
k are estimated through regression analysis on empirical data by using the Matlab curve
fitting toolbox [75], and the coefficient of determination R2 is very close to 1 for all esti-
mates.
Host Patching Only Scheme
Under this defense scheme, we begin to randomly patch infected hosts with rp = 2 ×
10−5/sec after all vulnerable machines get infected. Once patched, an infected host be-
comes invulnerable, and the node and its associated links are removed from the worm
forest. We then examine the P2P-based botnet structure when nd hosts get patched. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.5.
Fig. 5.5(a) shows the distribution of the number of peers, comparing the simulation
results of bndn0(i) for nd = 0, n0/4, and n0/2 with the exponential scaling obtained through
regression. Note that the y-axis uses the log-scale and the error bar represents the standard
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Figure 5.5: Host patching only scheme.
deviation over 100 runs. The dotted line represents the standard deviation that goes into
the negative territory. It can be seen that the distribution of the number of peers has an
exponential tail. Specifically, without user defenses (i.e., when nd = 0), b0n0(i) can be
well approximated by the geometric distribution with parameter 0.5 shown in Equation
(5.6), and therefore decreases exponentially with the decay constant λ = ln 2. However, as
infected hosts get patched, nodes that do not have any peer emerge in the forest. Moreover,
when nd increases, bndn0(i) still has an exponential tail, but decays faster. This is because
when more infected hosts get removed, there are fewer hosts with a large node degree and
more hosts becoming isolated nodes without any peer. On one hand, the exponential scaling
of bndn0(i) implies that after random patching, a small portion of bots still have a large number
of peers and the majority of bots have none or few peers. For example, when nd = n0/2, on
average over 99.7% of bots have no more than five peers. On the other hand, an increasing
decay constant indicates that the node degree of a bot decreases due to patching. For
example, the average node degree decreases from 2 when nd = 0 to 1 when nd = n0/2.
Moreover, through extensive regression analysis, we find that after user patching, in the
resulting P2P-based botnet topology, the decay constant λ ≈ ln ((n0 + nr)/nr), where
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nr = n0 − nd. For example, when half of infected hosts are patched, bndn0(i) decreases
exponentially with a decay constant approximately of ln 3.
Fig. 5.5(b) demonstrates the distribution of the botnet size, comparing the simulation
results of tndn0(j) for nd = 0, n0/4, and n0/2 with the power-law tails obtained through
regression. Note that the x- and y-axes use the log-scale. It can be seen that when nd = 0,
t0n0(n0) = 1. That is, without patching, worm infection forms a single botnet with n0
nodes. However, with infected hosts being patched, the distribution of the botnet size has
a power-law tail. Moreover, when nd increases, the scaling exponent k becomes larger.
This is because as we patch more infected hosts, the number of trees in the forest increases,
whereas the maximum size of trees decreases. For example, when nd = n0/2, on average
there are 90, 011 trees1 in the forest with an average size of 2 nodes. The average maximum
tree size is 622 nodes, comprising less than 0.04% of infected hosts in the forest. Therefore,
the size of the largest botnet is relatively small, indicating that patching infected hosts
severely disrupts the single botnet formed by worm infection.
After performing sensitivity analysis on the parameter rp when nd is fixed, we find that
the patching rate does not affect the botnet structure.
Host Cleaning Only Scheme
Under this defense scheme, we begin to randomly clean infected hosts with rc = 2 ×
10−5/sec after all vulnerable machines get compromised. Once cleaned, an infected host
becomes susceptible, and the host and its associated links are removed from the forest. Note
that different from patching, cleaned infected hosts can be compromised again and rejoin
the forest. We then examine the P2P-based botnet structure when nd hosts get cleaned. The
results are shown in Fig. 5.6.
1We consider that isolated nodes without any peer are a special tree of size one.
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Figure 5.6: Host cleaning only scheme.
Fig.s 5.6(a) and (b) show the results of the distributions of the number of peers and the
botnet size. It can be seen that bndn0(i) still has an exponential decay and tndn0(j) has a power-
law tail. As a result, after user cleaning, a small portion of bots still have a large number
of peers, and the majority of bots have none or few peers. For example, when nd = n0/2,
the average node degree of bots is 1.36, and on average about 99.3% of them have a node
degree of no more than five. Moreover, cleaning infected hosts severely disrupts the single
botnet formed by worm infection. For example, when nd = n0/2, on average there are
110, 740 disconnected botnets in the forest with an average size of 3 nodes. The average
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maximum size of the disconnected botnets is 2, 954 nodes, comprising about 0.85% of the
remaining infected hosts in the forest. However, compared with the patching only scheme,
the exponential and power-law scaling parameters under the host cleaning only scheme
are smaller. This is due to the different nature of patching and cleaning. Under the host
cleaning only scheme, when nd hosts are cleaned, some of them get compromised again
and rejoin the worm forest. As a result, the number of remaining infected hosts in the
forest nr > (n0 − nd). Comparatively, under the host patching only scheme, when nd
nodes are patched, nr = n0 − nd. Therefore, as expected, the host cleaning only scheme
less disrupts the botnet structure than the host patching only scheme. Moreover, as shown
in Fig. 5.6(c), we find that under the host cleaning only scheme, on average nr stabilizes
at around 345, 950. This happens when the number of nodes being cleaned, nr · rc, is
about the same with the number of susceptible hosts getting infected again, (n0 − nr) · pi,
where pi = nr · s · 1232 is the probability of a susceptible host being compromised. Setting
nr · rc = (n0− nr) · nr · s ·
1
232
, we then obtain that the number of nodes in the worm forest
will stabilize at nr = n0 − rcs · 2
32
. For example, with rc = 2 × 10−5/sec and s = 358
scans/min, nr = 345, 603, which is very close to our simulation result. In the figure, we
also find that nr is about the same for the cases of nd = n0/4 and n0/2. However, bndn0(i)
and tndn0(j) of the case nd = n0/2 has larger scaling parameters. This is due to the fact that
hosts with a large number of peers might get cleaned, whereas susceptible hosts rejoin the
forest as leaves with a node degree of one. As a result, although the number of infected
hosts stabilizes at the same level, the host cleaning process decreases the node degree of
infected hosts over time and further disrupts the worm forest. Furthermore, we find that
the cleaning rate rc has little effect on the botnet structure when nd is fixed. On one hand,
a smaller cleaning rate corresponds to a larger stabilized botnets population nr. One the
other hand, it takes more time to clean nd nodes with a smaller cleaning rate.
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Figure 5.7: Host patching/cleaning scheme.
Host Patching/Cleaning Scheme
Under this defense scheme, we consider both user patching and cleaning, which is the
case in real world scenarios. Specifically, we begin to randomly clean infected hosts with
rc = 2 × 10
−5/sec after all vulnerable hosts get compromised. Meanwhile, susceptible
and infected hosts are randomly patched with rp = 2 × 10−5/sec. We then examine the
P2P-based botnet structure when nd hosts get patched or cleaned. The results are shown
in Fig. 5.7. It is intuitive that the distributions of the number of peers and the botnet size
exhibit the combined effects of the host patching only and the host cleaning only schemes.
Specifically, the exponential decay constant λ and the power-law scaling exponent k are
smaller than those under the host patching only scheme but greater than those under the
host cleaning only scheme. For example, when nd = n0/2, the average node degree of
bots is 1.21, and on average about 99.5% of them have no more than five peers. Moreover,
on average there are 100, 535 disconnected botnets in the forest with an average size of 2.5
nodes. The average maximum size of the disconnected botnets is 1, 636 nodes, comprising
about 0.64% of the remaining infected hosts in the forest.
The simulation results of all three defense schemes show that when users patch or clean
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Figure 5.8: Worm re-infection topology.
part of infected hosts, P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection suffer two weaknesses.
First, the botnets are highly centralized to a small percentage of the “hub” bots that have
a large node degree, and thus vulnerable to targeted defenses [72, 16]. Second, the single
botnet formed by worm infection is severly disrupted into a collection of small isolated
low-effective botnets.
5.2.3 P2P-based Botnets Formed by Worm Re-infection
In this section, we study a potential countermeasure by future botnets to combat against
user patching or cleaning.
A simple potential countermeasure for botmasters to construct more robust and effective
P2P-based botnets is through worm re-infection. That is, if an infected host is hit by a worm
scan, this host will be further re-infected and become a peer of the infector. As a result, the
remaining bots may have a balanced node degree and stay well connected even when some
infected hosts get patched or cleaned (see Fig. 5.8). Note that different from the botnet
formed by re-infection discussed in [4], in our P2P-based botnet, there is no exchange of
peers between bots. Infected hosts are only peers to their own infectors and infectees.
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Figure 5.9: P2P-based botnets formed by worm re-infection.
To show the effectiveness of worm re-infection on P2P-based botnets against user
patching or cleaning, we consider the host patching only scheme, which is the worst case
scenario. As shown in Section 5.2.2, under the host patching only scheme, bndn0(i) and t
nd
n0
(j)
have the largest scaling parameters among the three schemes, and therefore the resulting
P2P-based botnets are least robust and effective. In Fig. 5.9, we compare the network struc-
ture of botnets formed by worm infection only and by worm re-infection when nd hosts get
patched. Here, the vulnerable population n0 is set to 10, 000. All other parameters ramain
the same as the ones used in Section 5.2.2. Moreover, for worm re-infection, once a vulner-
able host gets compromised, it is open for re-infection from the next time tick. We begin
to randomly patch infected hosts with rp = 2× 10−5/sec when all vulnerable machines get
compromised. Once patched, the infected host becomes invulnerable, and the host and its
associated links are then removed from the botnet topology. Fig. 5.9(a) shows the distribu-
tion of the number of peers. It can be seen that in the P2P-based botnet formed by worm
re-infection, when half of infected hosts get patched, bndn0(i) has a bell shape and therefore
the node degree of a bot is more evenly distributed. For example, on average 92.56% of
bots have a node degree between 5 and 15, and the average node degree of bots is 9. On
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one hand, such a botnet is resilient to both random and targeted defenses [72, 16]. On the
other hand, the P2P-based botnet formed by worm re-infection may have an average node
degree similar to other P2P networks [76]. As a result, it may appear to have normal P2P
traffic and can potentially avoid detection [16]. Moreover, by further connecting to other
bots, the P2P-based botnet formed by worm re-infection stays well connected. In [16],
Dagon et al. used the giant component or the size of the largest connected botnet to mea-
sure the effectiveness. In Fig. 5.9(b), we show the percentage of the giant component to the
available bots. It can be seen that for the botnets formed by worm re-infection, almost all
of the remaining bots are connected, whereas the giant component of the botnets formed
by worm infection comprises only 2.2% of the remaining infected hosts. Therefore, P2P-
based botnets formed by worm re-infection are much more robust and effective than those
formed by worm infection only.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Characterizing Internet Worm Temporal Infection Structure
In Chapter 3, we have attempted to estimate the temporal characteristics of Internet worms
through both analysis and simulation under the framework of Internet worm tomography.
Specifically, we have proposed method of moments, maximum likelihood, and linear re-
gression estimators to infer the host infection time and reconstruct the worm infection se-
quence. We have shown analytically and empirically that the mean squared error of our
proposed estimators can be almost half of that of the naive estimator in estimating the host
infection time. Moreover, we have formulated the problem of estimating the worm infec-
tion sequence as a detection problem and have calculated the probability of error detection
for different estimators. We have demonstrated empirically that our estimation techniques
perform much better than the algorithm used in [13] in estimating the worm infection
sequence and in identifying the hitlist for both random-scanning and localized-scanning
worms.
6.2 Characterizing Internet Worm Spatial Infection Structure
In Chapter 4, we have attempted to capture the key characteristics of the tree topology
formed by worm infection. We have shown analytically and empirically that for the in-
fection tree formed by a wide class of worms, the number of children asymptotically has
a geometric distribution with parameter 0.5; and the generation closely follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter En[G] (i.e., Hn − 1). As a result, on average half of infected
hosts never compromise any target, over 98% of nodes have no more than five children,
and a small portion of hosts have a large number of children. Moreover, the average path
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length of the worm tree increases approximately logarithmically with the number of nodes.
We have also demonstrated empirically that similar observations can be found in localized-
scanning worms.
6.3 Evaluating P2P-based Botnets Formed by Worm Infection
In Chapter 5, we have attempted to evaluate bot detection strategies and effects of user
defenses in P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection. Specifically, we have applied
the observations of the number of children to bot detection and found analytically and em-
pirically that targeted detection is an efficient way to expose bots in a Conficker C like
botnet. However, we have also pointed out that a simple countermeasure by future botnets
can weaken the performance of targeted detection, without greatly slowing down the speed
of worm infection. Moreover, we have characterized the network structure of P2P-based
botnets formed by worm infection under user countermeasures. We have shown that when
part of infected hosts are randomly patched or cleaned after all vulnerable hosts get com-
promised, the distribution of the number of peers of a bot has an exponential scaling and
the distribution of the size of disconnected botnets has a power-law tail. As a result, P2P-
based botnets formed by worm infection are vulnerable to targeted defenses and ineffective
due to patching or cleaning. We have then applied the observations to design future botnets
and found that botmasters can significantly enhance the robustness and the effectiveness of
P2P-based botnets through worm re-infection.
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6.4 Future Work
6.4.1 Real-World Data Verification
One limitation of this work is that our analytical results are verified through simulations
rather than real-world data. As far as we know, there is no direct dataset of the worm
spatial-temporal infection structures publicly available. However, we may extract some
indirect knowledge from worm traces to serve as an approximation of the ground truth.
For example, for the worm temporal infection structure, we may use first hits observed
at a large Darknet (e.g., a /8 network telescope) to serve as a comparison basis, and then
apply estimators to observations of a much smaller Darknet (e.g., a /24 network telescope)
for performance evaluation. Moreover, some works have inferred the information of “who
infected whom” [24, 14], which may be used as an approximation of the real worm tree to
verify our analytical results of the worm spatial infection structure.
6.4.2 Fractal Analysis
A fractal is a rough or fragmented geometric shape that can be split into parts, each of
which is a reduced-size copy of the whole [77]. The defining characteristic of a fractal is
self-similarity. Fractals have broad applications in ecology, biology and the Earth sciences
[78]. One of the most familiar examples of self-similarity is a tree. The pattern of branching
is very similar and repeated throughout the tree. If we capture a small group of infected
hosts that are connected as a branch in the worm tree, one interesting question is that, by
analyzing the fractal patterns of the captured branch, can we predict characteristics of worm
propagation or P2P-based botnets formed by worm infection as a whole? This enables us
to understand and defend against worms or botnets with significantly reduced efforts and
costs.
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APPENDIX A
INTERNET WORM TEMPORAL INFECTION STRUCTURE
A.1 Estimator Properties (µˆ)
We calculate the bias, the variance, and the MSE of different estimators for estimating µ.
A.1.1 Naive Estimator
Since µˆNE = 1, the bias of NE is
Bias(µˆNE) = E(µˆNE)− µ = 1− 1p . (1)
Note that µˆNE is constant. Thus, the variance of NE is
Var(µˆNE) = E [(µˆNE − E(µˆNE))2] = 0. (2)
Therefore,
MSE(µˆNE) = Bias2(µˆNE) + Var(µˆNE) = (1−p)
2
p2
. (3)
A.1.2 Method of Moments Estimator / Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Since E(δi) = µ for i = 1, 2, · · · , n − 1 and Equations (3.8) and (3.14) hold, the bias of
µˆMME (or µˆMLE) is calculated as
Bias(µˆMME) = E
(
1
n−1
∑n−1
i=1 δi
)
− µ = 0, (4)
which is unbiased. Note that Var(δi) = 1−pp2 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n−1 and δi’s are independent.
Thus, we have
Var(µˆMME) = Var
(
1
n−1
∑n−1
i=1 δi
)
= 1−p
p2(n−1)
. (5)
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Therefore, the MSE of µˆMME (or µˆMLE) is
MSE(µˆMME) = Bias2(µˆMME) + Var(µˆMME) = 1−pp2(n−1) . (6)
It is noted that for an unbiased estimator, the MSE is identical to its variance.
A.1.3 Linear Regression Estimator
Note that µˆLRE = i·t−i·t
i2−(i)2
. From Equation (3.20) and ti = t0 +
∑i−1
j=0 δj , i = 1, 2, · · · , n, we
have
i · t = 1
n
∑n
i=1 i · ti
= n+1
2
t0 +
1
n
∑n−1
i=0
∑n
j=i+1 j · δi
= n+1
2
t0 +
∑n−1
i=0
(n−i)(n+i+1)
2n
δi (7)
and
i · t = i · 1
n
∑n
i=1 ti = i · t0 + i ·
∑n−1
i=0
n−i
n
δi. (8)
Since i = n+1
2
and i2 = (n+1)(2n+1)
6
,
i · t− i · t =
∑n−1
i=1
i(n−i)
2n
δi (9)
and
i2 −
(
i
)2
= n
2−1
12
. (10)
Note that E(δi) = µ and Var(δi) = 1−pp2 , i = 0, 1, · · · , n − 1, and δi’s are independent.
Moreover,
∑n
i=1 i
3 =
(
n(n+1)
2
)2
and
∑n
i=1 i
4 = 1
30
(6n5 + 15n4 + 10n3 − n). Then, we
have
E(i · t− i · t) =
∑n−1
i=1
i(n−i)
2n
µ = n
2−1
12
µ (11)
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and
Var(i · t− i · t) =
∑n−1
i=1
(
i(n−i)
2n
)2
· 1−p
p2
= 1−p
4n2p2
(n2
∑n−1
i=1 i
2 − 2n
∑n−1
i=1 i
3 +
∑n−1
i=1 i
4)
= 1−p
p2
· n
4−1
120n
. (12)
Therefore, the bias of µˆLRE can be calculated as
Bias(µˆLRE) = E
(
i·t−i·t
i2−(i)2
)
− µ = 0, (13)
which is unbiased. Moreover, the variance and the MSE of µˆLRE are
MSE(µˆLRE) = Var(µˆLRE)
= Var
(
i·t−i·t
i2−(i)2
)
= 6(n
2+1)(1−p)
5n(n2−1)p2
. (14)
A.2 Estimator Properties (tˆ0)
We calculate the bias, the variance, and the MSE of different estimators for estimating t0.
A.2.1 Naive Estimator
Since tˆ0NE = t1 − µˆNE = t0 + δ0 − 1, E(δ0) = 1p , and Var(δ0) =
1−p
p2
,
Bias(tˆ0NE) = t0 + E(δ0)− 1− t0 = 1−pp (15)
Var(tˆ0NE) = Var(t0 + δ0 − 1) = 1−pp2 (16)
MSE(tˆ0NE) = Bias2(tˆ0NE) + Var(tˆ0NE)
= (1−p)(2−p)
p2
. (17)
Note that when p≪ 1, MSE(tˆ0NE) ≈ 2(1−p)p2 .
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A.2.2 Method of Moments Estimator / Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Note that tˆ0MME = tˆ0MLE = t0 + δ0 − µˆMME and E(δ0) = E(µˆMME) = µ. Thus,
Bias(tˆ0MME) = t0 + E(δ0)− E(µˆMME)− t0 = 0 (18)
MSE(tˆ0MME) = Var(tˆ0MME) = Var(δ0 − µˆMME). (19)
Since µˆMME = 1n−1
∑n−1
i=1 δi that is independent of δ0,
MSE(tˆ0MME) = Var(tˆ0MME)
= Var(δ0) + Var(µˆMME)
= 1−p
p2
· n
n−1
, (20)
based on Equation (5) and Var(δ0) = 1−pp2 . Note that when n≫ 1, MSE(tˆ0MME) ≈ 1−pp2 .
A.2.3 Linear Regression Estimator
Since tˆ0LRE = t0 + δ0 − µˆLRE and E(δ0) = E(µˆLRE) = µ,
Bias(tˆ0LRE) = t0 + E(δ0)− E(µˆLRE)− t0 = 0 (21)
MSE(tˆ0LRE) = Var(tˆ0LRE) = Var(δ0 − µˆLRE). (22)
Note that from Equations (9) and (10), µˆLRE = 12n2−1
∑n−1
i=1
i(n−i)
2n
δi that is independent of δ0.
Hence,
MSE(tˆ0LRE) = Var(tˆ0LRE)
= Var(δ0) + Var(µˆLRE)
= 1−p
p2
· 5n
3+6n2−5n+6
5n(n2−1)
, (23)
based on Equation (14) and Var(δ0) = 1−pp2 . Note that when n≫ 1, MSE(tˆ0LRE) ≈ 1−pp2 .
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APPENDIX B
INTERNET WORM SPATIAL INFECTION STRUCTURE
B.1 Statistical Properties of the Number of Children
We apply z-transform to derive the expectation and the variance of the number of children.
First, note that Corollary 4.2.3 holds for n = 1 and 2. Next, when n ≥ 3, we define
z-transform
Xn(z) =
∑n−1
i=0 cn(i)z
−i. (24)
Setting cn−1(−1) = 1, we can transform Theorem 4.2.2 to
cn(i) =
n−2
n
cn−1(i) +
1
n
cn−1(i− 1), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, (25)
when n ≥ 3. Then, putting Equation (25) into Equation (24), we can obtain the difference
equation of z-transform
Xn(z) =
(
1
n
z−1 + n−2
n
)
Xn−1(z) +
1
n
. (26)
Note that En[C] = −dXn(z)dz |z=1 and Xn−1(1) = 1, which leads to
En[C] = n−1n En−1[C] +
1
n
. (27)
Since E2[C] = 12 , we can show by induction that
En[C] = n−1n . (28)
Moreover, En[C2] = ddz
[
z dXn(z)
dz
]
|z=1 yields
En[C2] = n−1n En−1[C
2] + 2
n
En−1[C] + 1n (29)
= n−1
n
En−1[C2] + 3n−5n2 . (30)
Thus, we can use E2[C2] = 12 to prove by induction that
En[C2] = 2 + (n−1)(n−2)n2 −
2Hn
n
, (31)
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where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
is the n-th harmonic number [15]. Therefore,
Varn[C] = En[C2]− E2n[C] (32)
= 2− n−1
n2
− 2Hn
n
. (33)
B.2 Statistical Properties of the Generation
Similar to the proof of Corollary 4.2.3, we apply z-transform to derive the expectation and
the variance of the generation. First, note that Corollary 4.2.6 holds for n = 1 and 2. Next,
when n ≥ 3, we define z-transform
Yn(z) =
∑n−1
j=0 gn(j)z
−j . (34)
Putting Equation (4.20) into Equation (34), we can obtain the difference equation of z-
transform
Yn(z) =
(
1
n
z−1 + n−1
n
)
Yn−1(z). (35)
Note that En[G] = −dYn(z)dz |z=1 and Yn−1(1) = 1, which leads to
En[G] = En−1[G] + 1n . (36)
Since E2[G] = 12 , we can show by induction that
En[G] = Hn − 1. (37)
Moreover, En[G2] = ddz
[
z dYn(z)
dz
]
|z=1 yields
En[G2] = En−1[G2] + 2nEn−1[G] +
1
n
. (38)
Therefore, combining Equations (36) and (38) gives
Varn[G] = En[G2]− E2n[G]
= En−1[G2] + 1n(2En−1[G] + 1)
−(En−1[G] + 1n)
2
= Varn−1[G] + 1n −
1
n2
. (39)
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Thus, we can use Var2[G] = 14 to prove by induction that
Varn[G] = Hn −Hn,2, (40)
where Hn =
∑n
i=1
1
i
and Hn,2 =
∑n
i=1
1
i2
.
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